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The issue of the impact of natural disasters on society
is an important question in geographic· research.

Geography

has traditionally taken a sociological viewpoint on this
issue, but recent research has questioned some of the basic

assumptions of the hazards literature, and has suggested
that a much broader understanding of social process is
necessary in order to analyze the impact of a natural
disaster on a particular social system.

This approach sees

society as being in a constant state of "structuration,"

i.e., members of a social order build on the physical and
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cultural givens of the social system into which they were
born while at the same time they transform them.

The

proponents of structuration theory, however, have done
lillle empirical research of particular events.

This paper

suggests that the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City and the
social conflict it generated, in the form of a labor
conflict between the costureras (seamstresses) of the
garment district, the government and the factory owners,
offers an excellent opportunity to analyze social process in
relation to physical structure.

In this setting, the impact

of a natural disaster is very complex, because of the
complex relationships of those who are its victims.
The paper traces out the relationships between three
sets of actors--workers, factory owners, and government-before, during and after the 1985 Mexico City earthquake,
and places those relationships in the broader context of
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Mexico's political and economic development, as well as the

!

spatial structure of Mexico City and the garment district.
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The paper concludes that although victims respond to the
crisis by attempting to restore and repair previous social
and physical conditions, as social theory predicts,
disasters have different effects on different classes of
people, who respond according to their needs,

vulnerabilities, perceptions, values, and their socially
prescribed powers.

Where there is no consensus among social
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classes as to what the normal or desirable social system is
or ought to be, conflict between sectors of the population,
which was embedded in the social and spatial system, takes a
new form as a result of new conditions caused by the
disaster.
The research methodology was mostly archival, relying

I
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on contemporary newspaper accounts of the events, interviews
with the participants, and publications by the union and
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researchers who collected information for the union.
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Recently published scholarly works were relied on for
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Mexico's history and political and economic development, and
a broad array of works on social theory, from the fields of
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geography and other social disciplines, were drawn from for
analysis.

The paper concludes by suggesting that further

research needs to be done on the creation of "opportunity
surfaces" through social structuration, the relationship
between spatial change and social change, and group
emergence as a result of natural disaster.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On September 19, 1985, at 7:19 a.m., an earthquake
measuring 8.1 on the Richter scale rocked Mexico City.
shaking of the city lasted approximately two minutes.

The
An

estimated 500 to 1,000 buildings came down, while up to
3,000 others were damaged.

Figures for the death toll range

from 4,000 by official government figures to 20,000 by
newspaper accounts.

Between 100,000 and 250,000 people were

left homeless and 30,000 were injured (U.S. AID 1986).
In the garment district of central Mexico City, in the
region known as San Antonio Abad and an area to its north
called simply el centro (the Center), as many as 1600
seamstresses, or costureras, were killed when the buildings
in which they were working, originally designed for housing
and small shops, collapsed under the weight of heavy
machinery during the earthquake.

over the next several days

and weeks, rescue efforts were co-ordinated and carried out
by family and friends of the costureras, as there was no
apparent government agency available to do this work.
Gradually, the "sweatshop" conditions of the factories in
which the women had been working came to public attention.
Further, when the owners of the shops began to rescue their
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machinery, materials and strongboxes with privately hired
men and equipment, while the Army prevented the families of
costureras from rescuing the workers, open conflict broke
out in the district.

costureras and their supporters seized

goods as they were brought out of the factories, they sat
down in front of heavy machinery rented by owners to remove
equipment, and they confronted owners of the shops for
rescue and back pay.
Word of the events spread quickly, mostly through the
work of feminist journalists who published dally accounts of
the conflicts, and immediately the costureras became a cause
celebre.

Help came from all over the city: women's groups

organized food and daycare for the costureras, who were
sleeping on the streets and literally sitting on seized
equipment; lawyers came to offer legal assistance; union
organizers and radical leftists came to help with the
political work.

Within two weeks, the costureras decided to

form a single union out of the several groups that had
sprung up all over the district.

The next two weeks were a

time of intense activity, as the scale of the organizing and
the demands went up.

Foremost among the demands was the

rescue of women still inside the buildings; later, the
workers demanded recovery of bodies.

Calls were made for

registration of clandestine factories, for inspection of
buildings for safety before workers were required to resume
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work in them, for minimum wages, reparations and severance
pay, retroactive Social Security, backpay, and daycare and
transportation costs.

Most of all, the women demanded an

independent union, one that would operate outside all of
Mexico's existing federally administered labor unions.
The government was caught short by the revelations of
the conditions in these factories, and of the repressive
acts of the soldiers, and was forced to send representatives
to the district to promise studies and better conditions.
That did not satisfy the demands.

On October 19, 1985, just

one month after the earthquake, the costureras marched en
masse to the Presidential Palace and met with the President
of Mexico, demanding their own, independent union.

On

October 20, 1985, the Secretary of Labor personally signed
the articles granting official recognition to the union, El
Sindicato de las Costureras 19 de Septiembre (19th of
September Union of Garment Workers), the first such
independent union to be recognized in Mexico in fifteen
years.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This paper proposes to undertake an analysis of these
events in light of geographic and social science literature
concerning the impact of natural disasters on social
systems.

Specifically, this paper will focus on the role of
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the earthquake in the processes of social change.

Since a

militant labor union is not an expected outcome of an
earthquake, the question ls both why and how the Union 1
emerged from the crisis of the earthquake.

It is assumed

that the earthquake either created conflicts, or exacerbated
or changed pre-existing conflicts, and it did so by some
identifiable means.

The purpose of this paper is to

identify those conflicts, or potential conflicts, and to
examine the role of the earthquake in relation to those
conflicts.

Previous geographic literature sheds some light

on this question, but it also points up areas needing
further research.
NATURAL DISASTER IN GEOGRAPHIC LITERATURE

Natural hazards

2

research began with Gilbert White's

research in the mid-1940's on the human occupancy of floodprone areas.

Work by White, and later by White and two of

his students, Ian Burton and Robert Kates, was consciously
based on human ecology (Burton 1974; Kates 1971).

That is,

human society is assumed to be in a state of dynamic
equilibrium with natural systems, and thus must make
periodic adjustments in response to the actions of natural
systems.

Those responses are.based upon the rational

decision-making of individuals and of governmental policymakers, based on their perceptions, knowledge and
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experiences.

The approach focuses on the technological and

scientifically informed way that individuals and managers
can predict, mitigate or respond to various kinds of natural
disasters.

Burton, Kates and White have had such a strong

influence on geographic research of natural hazards and
disasters that as late as 1974, James K. Mitchell organized
an overview of the literature of natural hazards research
along the above-described lines (Mitchell 1974).

The

overview covers human occupancy of hazard areas, variations
in types of events, individual perceptions of hazards,
policy-makers' perceptions of hazards, policy-makers'
responses to hazards, and listed under "effects of natural
hazards" costs and losses, benefits, and intangibles.
Clearly such an approach is not useful in examining
the events of the earthquake in Mexico City and the labor
union that emerged from it.

These works contain no sense of

social organization outside of the lone individual, or many
lone individuals on the one hand, and the non-personal
machinery of their governments on the other.

The emphasis

on "management" assumes an objective and rational
bureaucratic system and an undifferentiated, passive
population, assumptions which overlook government's
potential for its own political agenda.

Omitted are any

sense of class, caste, community, tribe, clan, ethnicity,
religion, and gender, as well as the expression of power and

...........
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conflicts between such social groups, including those groups
which provide the "managers" in times of disaster.
are hints of this gap in the literature.

There

Mitchell referred

to "a lack of detailed studies of collective adjustment
decisions, especially at the local community level"
(Mitchell 1974: 331).

Kates, in his analysis of the human

impact of the Managua, Nicaragua earthquake of 1972, stated
that too much emphasis had been placed on the physical
events and not enough on the social consequences of the
disasters.

"Of some 40 earthquakes in the last 25 years for

which detailed scientific and engineering reports are
available, only four have been seriously studied and
reported upon by social scientists" (Kates 1973: 981).
However, sociologists have written extensively on the
impact of natural disasters on local communities, to the
extent that this particular question has become somewhat of
a specialty of sociology. 3

_ _ _ _ _ __

Works by Baker (1962), Barton

(1963, 1969), Dynes (1970), Form (1958), Mileti (1975),
Prince (1920), Quarantelli (1978), and Sorokin (1942) show
that for a number of years, sociologists have done serious
research on the impact of natural disasters on society.
Much of this work has drawn on geographic literature,
possibly because geographic literature includes research on
the physical dynamics of the events themselves, which ls
lacking ln the sociological research; the geographic
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literature, however, has not made use of the sociological

research.

For example, while the Mileti work entitled Human

Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective
(1975) cites liberally from the individual and collective
works of Burton, Kates and White, the classic work by
Burton, Kates and White The Environment as Hazard. (1978)
does not cite Barton, Dynes, Quarentelll or any of the other
sociological works cited above.

Nevertheless, the same

approach to natural disasters and their impact on social
systems informs both the sociological and the geographic
approaches: society is assumed to be in a state of
equilibrium or normalcy, the disaster disrupts that
equilibrium by creating an impact from outside the social
system, and the response of the social system is to provide
relief, restoration and reconstruction of the previous state
of affairs as soon and as completely as possible.

Sjoberg's

statement that "quite soon after the disaster, actors strive
to reinstate the disrupted patterns--to recover the state of
normalcy or equilibrium" ls a typical example of this human
ecology approach (Sjoberg 1962: 369).
With the advent of the famine in the Sahel region of
Africa in the late 1960's and mid-1970's, a sudden and
distinctive turn was taken in the analysis of natural
disasters, their causes and consequences.

Based on the work

of French geographers (Copans 1983; Helllassoux 1974), as
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well as rethinking by the international relief agencies such
as the United Nations (Stephens 1979) and the Red Cross
(Wijkman 1984), criticisms were raised that the traditional
approach to disaster research failed to analyze the
political, economic and social contexts in which disasters
occurred.

Specifically, such articles as o•Keefe's "Taking

the Naturalness out of Natural Disasters" (1976), Torry's
"Hazards, Hazes and Holes" (1979a), and Waddell's "The
Hazards of Scientlsm" (1977) took strong issue with the
basic philosophical orientation of hazards research up to
that point.

Citing the fact that the number of natural

disasters has increased in the last 40 years, that the
extent of their damage has also increased, and that most of
this increase has occurred in the undeveloped and
underdeveloped Third World (Thompson 1982), the articles
argued that the economic as well as the ecological causes of
natural disasters needed close analysis.

The argument is

specifically socialist in its orientation and states that
the causes of natural disasters are not outside human
activity, but rather are intimately tied to capitalist
development in the Third World--1.e., exploitation of both
people and natural resources by the developed world and by
minority elites of the Third World (Copans 1983; Susman
1983; Watts 1983).

This exploitation ls seen as placing

increasing pressure on the vulnerable environments of the

r-·& --.--& --·. &-- - ·-&
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earth through human activity, and creating hazards where

none existed before, such as creating flood hazards through
deforestation.

In addition, economic exploitation places an

increasing portion of the human population at risk of
suffering the consequences of disaster, since it is the poor
who are the least able to bear the brunt of natural
disasters, and the impoverished portion of the human race is
increasing.

The new criticism wishes to examine precisely

this process of increasing impoverishment, or
"marginalization," of the world's population, in order to
understand the source of suffering from natural disasters.
Probably the culmination of this criticism, certainly its
best exposition to date, is Hewitt's Interpretations of
Calamity (1983) which is interestingly subtitled "From the
Viewpoint of Human Ecology."

This text makes the most

cogent argument to date that the sclentlf ic assessment of
natural disasters, with its technological approach to hazard
prevention and its assumptions about the orderly management
of normal society, is an analysis which cannot be sustained
ln the face of mounting evidence of its cultural and
political roots in the developed, and therefore exploiting,
nations.
As a result of these criticisms, recent geographic
research, such as Blaikie's The Political Economy of Soil
Erosion in Developing Countries (1985), has concentrated on
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the political and economic roots of so-called natural
disasters.

However, it is important to go beyona social,

economic and political "contexts" in which disasters occur,
as these are not preordained givens.

They are the results

of ongoing dynamic interactions between human beings and
their natural environment, and human beings and their social
institutions.

They are the result of what Barrows called

the "continuous evolution" of human activity in a specific
place (Barrows 1923).

Where a natural disaster, such as the

1985 Mexico City earthquake, is clearly not caused by human
activity of any political or economic stripe, its
consequences can still be assessed in political and economic
terms, as the impact of the earthquake was not felt evenly
across Mexican society, and the differences have political
roots.

The radical approach, so-named by Marston (1983),

seeks a clearer understanding of the process of social
system building in order to understand the relationship
between natural disasters (causes and consequences) and
"society" in all its dynamic, interacting, structure
building complexity.

For that, geographic research needs to

draw on more than political economy, and it needs a much
more dynamic and sophisticated model of social system
creation and interaction than it has assumed until recently.

11

SOCIAL SYSTEMS IN GEOGRAPHIC LITERATURE

It must not be forgotten that natural disasters happen
in space and time to real people.

In order to understand

the effect of a natural disaster on society, it is necessary
to know how the people involved are organized, as members of
classes, castes, communities, tribes, clans, religions,
ethnic groups, genders, how much political and economic
power they have within their social context, and how
conflict between the various groups is expressed, including
spatially.

Indeed, the question has shifted from a general

one of "how do natural disasters affect society'?" to a more
specific one of "who suffers and why'?"

This question cannot

be answered without a full understanding of the social
process of a particular society.
Social processes manifest themselves in the
arrangement of social space.

"It is now generally

recognized that space is socially constructed and in its
turn, once bounded and shaped, influences social relations"
(McDowell 1983: 62).

The issue of the social construction

of space (the "structuration" of space) has received much
attention in geographic literature in recent years.

Indeed,

Soja calls the social construction of space "human geography
in its fullest sense" (Soja 1979: 4).

This theoretical work

draws on the works of Anthony Giddens, whose vast philosophy
of sociology attempts to explicate the interweaving of the
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individual with the institutional structures of his/her
society.

It also draws on the work of Torsten Hagerstrand,

whose geographic research on innovation dlf fusion was
leading him to an understanding of the weaving of the
individual into the spatial structures of his/her society.
Geographers such as Gregory (1985b), Hoos (1986a, 1986b),
Pred (1981, 1984), Thrift (1983), and others have attempted
to put the two strands of thought together.

The goal is to

analyze how individuals, as thinking and acting members of,
and products of, their society, come together within the
context of the institutionalized social and spatial systems
into which they are born, to recreate but constantly modify
their social and spatial order.

The root problem of this

geographic research is to identify how the everyday paths of
ordinary individuals are shaped by, recreate and modify the
underlying but constantly developing social and spatial
relationships of that particular society (Gregory 1985a).
One weakness of this theoretical work is that it has
not been applied to very many unique historical cases or
events.

Hoos (1986b) applied the ideas of structuration to

the creation of a "ghetto" of mentally ill patients in one
Canadian city.

Pred (1985) analyzed the relationship

between enclosure of fields and social change in a rural
county in Sweden.

This paper suggests that the 1985

earthquake of Mexico City and the events immediately
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following it offer a very good opportunity to examine some
of the theoretical ideas outlined above from the perspective
of an actual historical event, or rather, an actual social
process.
First, Mexico City is a prime example of what Thrift
(1983) calls an "interaction structure."

It ls the result

of thousands of years of human interaction, which profoundly
shapes the lives of Mexico's people, both inside and outside
the city.

It most certainly shaped the lives of the people

involved in the conflicts in the garment district, both
before and after the earthquake.

Mexico City ls not a

neutral place in which events occur, like a flat stage with
a painted curtain for a backdrop.

Mexico City can almost be

seen as an active participant in the events themselves.
Certainly, it is a node of human interaction on a massive
scale and an earthquake in this setting will affect the
lives of millions of people.

The 1985 earthquake affords an

opportunity to examine how and why those lives were
affected.
Second, if the process of capitalist industrial
development does indeed have any relationship to who suffers
from a disaster and why, the earthquake in Mexico City
should provide a useful example.

Mexico is a developing

country which has experienced rapid economic growth in the
last fifty years and at the same time ls suffering from

r
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extreme disparities in the distribution of its wealth.
Massive social change caused by Mexico's economic
development has led to the emergence of a new class, which
this paper refers to as Mexico's "working poor."

The

costureras are a prime example of that newly emergent class.
An analysis of the creation of the "working poor," and their
position within Mexico's political and economic
institutions, will throw light on how the poor are made more
vulnerable to disasters through the workings of the social
system into which they are born and through which they must
act.
Third, this particular event affords the opportunity
to examine the fundamental question of structuration theory,
that of the relationship between thinking and acting
individuals and their determining social system, including
its spatial expression.

Thrift (1983) has identified the

labor process as the place where the two movements--that of
the individual in his or her daily path and that of social
structure in its process of constantly reproducing itself-meet.

It ls in the workplace that real people meet on a

daily basis, as members of their class, caste, community,
and gender, within a system of socially produced and
reproduced lnstltutlons, to produce and distribute their
material needs.

This daily meeting for reproduction and

survival reproduces, but constantly modifies, their social
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order.

Harston (1983) also identified the labor process as

the focus for understanding the impact of natural disasters
on societies, for it is through the labor process that
humans interact with nature in order to extract, produce and
distribute their material needs.

Thus, social processes,

including conflict and change, can be found in the labor
process.
Edwards, in The Social Organization of Industrial
Cpnflict (1982), identifies three levels of conflict in the
workplace: overt (both directed and non-directed),
institutionalized, and implicit.

overt conflict is

recognized and acted upon; institutionalized conflict is
also recognized, but is mediated through rules, contracts
and understandings, both formal and informal; and implicit
conflict is not acted upon and may or may not be discussed
or even recognized, but lt nevertheless exists.

The most

obvious form of implicit conflict is the need for capital
constantly to increase production from workers and
constantly decrease costs, whereas labor needs constantly to
protect itself from increasing exploitation while
maintaining or improving its position in the labor process.
This implicit conflict is built into the social organization
of production processes, and into their spatial
organization.
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The Mexico City garment district provides an
opportunity to examine the role of implicit class and gender
conflicts in the creation and dally operation of a place of
work.

Whatever conflicts existed in the overall social

context, conflicts which were played out in the creation of
the city, existed in their own form within the district and
the garment factories as well.
Finally, the events immediately following the
earthquake throw light on the issue of just how the
earthquake, as a natural disaster, affected ongoing social
process.

In particular, the role of the natural disaster in

changing implicit conflict to overt conflict can be
examined.

This can be done by analyzing the earthquake's

affect on spatial structure, in which the dynamics of a
particular social system were deeply embedded.
The analysis described above weaves a web of many
theories, but social process is a complex web of history,
ideology, psychology, chance, conflict and resolution, which
creates a built environment, a material reality, in which
the next generations are born and with which they must
operate.

Marx said "Men (sic] make history, but not in

circumstances of their own choosing" (Thrift 1983: 32).
Simple theories cannot be applied to complex processes.

The

following work is meant not so much to explain what happened

1
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from the viewpoint of theory, but to shed light on theory

from the viewpoint of actual events.
STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER
This paper starts with a particular situation among
particular people in a particular place and traces the
historical interactions that brought them together on the
day of the earthquake.

The three coalitions of actors

within the garment district were the costureras, the shop
owners and the federal government.

Each of these sets of

people represents broader social institutions, those of the
working poor, capital and the state.

The historical

development of these broader institutions, and their
interactions in the creation of Mexico City, grow out of
basic unresolved conflicts that have their roots in the
Revolution of 1910-1917.

Though the Revolution has deep

historical roots, that conflict affords an historical
boundary for this research.

The garment industry in Mexico

City was built by people involved in the social and economic
tensions of Mexico's development.

The earthquake, by

altering the spatial patterns of daily life and by creating
an emergency situation to which all parties had to respond,
forced those implicit conflicts to the surface to be
expressed in new ways.
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Chapter II sets Mexico City in its physical landscape,

and desctibes the city's history of earthquakes.

It also

discusses the growth of Mexico City as a place which
reflects Mexico's political and economic centralization and
describes the creation of the garment district within the
city.

Chapter III argues that the reasons conflict in the

garment district turned into political protest have much to
do with Mexico's historical relations between government and
labor, and in particular the conflict represents an ongoing
weakening of the traditional "bargain" between those two
sectors.

Chapter IV argues that the response of the

costureras to the earthquake has deep roots in the economic
development of Mexico and in the resulting demographic
changes.

In particular, the chapter argues that the women

were in a particularly weak position relative to both
capital and government, and the earthquake placed them in
the contradictory position of having nothing left, and yet
needing to fight the hardest to maintain .their position in
the system of production.

Chapter V argues that the owners

and government also had conflicts of interest, which
determined the way that each of these sectors responded to
the earthquake.

Chapter VI draws upon a broad array of

social science theory to analyze the role of the earthquake
as a separate event in creating social change, and makes

l

.j
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suggestions for geographic research based upon the

conclusions of this paper.
METHODOLOGY
The materials drawn upon for this research are mostly
archival.

Research was done during two trips to Mexico

City, in August and September of 1986 and February and March
of 1987.

Interviews were conducted with costureras and with

women who had organized their support, and with the
following people: Elena Urrutia, an editor and founder of
fem magazine and professor of women's studies at Colegio de
Mexico; Silvana Levi de Lopez, a geographer who has done
research on land use in the central district of Mexico City;
Sr. Taverna of Grupo Textil Cadena, the state-owned
corporation in the textile and garment industry; Sr.
Alejandro Gomez of INEGI, from whom air photos of the
district and INEGI reports on the textile and garment
industries were obtained; Teresa Carrillo, a researcher from
Stanford University writing her dissertation on the
costureras; Lisa Block, a development worker in Mexico City;
and Mary McGill, of the Hujer a Hujer (Woman to Woman)
program.
For primary materials, heavy reliance has been placed
on newspaper accounts in La Jornada, El Dia, Excels!..2.I., and
Uno Mas Uno,4 all of Mexico City.

Primary materials also
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include papers and leaflets written by the costureras, and
articles written about them by the people who were actively
involved in the crisis of the earthquake and the formation
of the Union.
For the rest, both Spanish and English resources on
the garment industry in Mexico were sought, including
government reports, trade publications, and research
articles in scholarly journals.

Recently published books

and articles were relied on for discussion of Mexico's
political and economic system, and its history.

For

theoretical background, sources in both hazards literature
and society-and-space literature were researched.

The

research was conducted from January through May of 1987,
though it ls this writer's hope that this process is only
the beginning of a lifelong acquaintance with an interesting
and important country and its people.

l

CHAPTER II
MEXICO CITY AND ITS EARTHQUAKES
Mexico City ls so closely identified with the nation
of Mexico that a crisis in the city ls a national crisis and
a national crisis is likely to be played out in the arena of
the city.

This ldentif ication is expressed in the fact that

most of Mexico's population, capital, political bodies and
industrial production are concentrated in the Mexico City
area.

Early in the nineteenth century Mexico City was

declared a Federal District, much like Washington, D.

c.,

and the administration of the city was placed directly in
the hands of the federal government, where it remains today.
The mayor of Mexico City is appointed by the president of
the nation, and the city's administration ls a ministry of
the federal government.
Mexico City is located at 19.24 degrees north latitude
and 99.09 degrees west longitude (Fig. 1), and at
approximately 8,000 feet above sea level is one of the
highest capital cities in the world.

It is also one of the

largest cities in the world, with an estimated population of
18 to 20 million people, a population that is expected to
reach 32 to 40 million by the year 2000.

Mexico City has a
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primacy ratio of 5.18, i.e., it is 5.18 times larger than
the second largest city of Mexico, Guadalajara (Brunn 1983).
The city sits ln the Valley of Mexico, surrounded by high
volcanoes, and is built on the unconsolidated soils of an
old lake bed.

Its sinking and tilting buildings, placed on

unstable foundations, have been well-known for many years.
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In approximately 1325, when the Chichimec people of

northern Mexico moved into the region of Lake Texcoco where
the Teotihuacan and Toltec civilizations had already
flourished and died, they in many ways sealed the fate of
the nation of Mexico.

The Chlchlmecs chose to settle on an

island in the lake, and within less than 200 years, they had
built the Aztec Empire by subduing, and extracting tribute
from, a widening circle of neighboring peoples.

They also

began to fill in the lake in order to use the land for
agriculture.

When the Spanish arrived in 1519, they picked

of£ the leader of this powerful and centrally located
empire, and placed themselves in the very center of one of
the New World's two most advanced civilizations.
The city grew slowly during the colonial period,
primarily because it did not build up an indigenous economic
base.

The city was used by the Spanish for military and

administrative headquarters.

The colonizers put their

efforts into extracting silver and raw materials from Mexico
and shipping them to Spain.

The profits from this

extractive activity were used to build a system of large
estates for the colonial landlords, estates which were not
meant to produce goods for agricultural trade, but which
were built on a feudal model: extensive family-owned land
holdings, access to temporary labor by native Indians, and
little exchange between estates.

The Indian peoples lived
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in their traditional communal villages, but their land
rights were always precarious, as the colonial landowners
regularly extended their claims to property, based on their
economic interests at the time.

Money invested in Mexico

City itself went into impressive administrative buildings,
cathedrals, parks and palaces.

The city became known as one

of the most beautiful in the world.

Its expansion, slow as

it was, was accomplished by draining the lake and building
on top of its soils.

The drainage was never entirely

successful, however, and the soils under the center of
Mexico City are saturated with water, requiring continuous
pumping.
This weak foundation has meant that Mexico City is
particularly vulnerable to damage from Mexico's frequent
earthquakes.

The Middle American Trench, formed where the

Cocos Plate meets the North American Plate, runs parallel to
the southern coast of Mexico (Fig. 1), and it is the
subduction of the Cocos Plate under the North American Plate
that ls the source of Mexico's many earthquakes.

This

boundary between the two plates is known to be one of the
most active plate margins in the world (Degg 1986).

The

nation suffers innumerable earthquakes of varying magnitudes
every year, including eight in this century of magnitude 6.2
or more on the Richter scale.

Mexico City suffered major

earthquakes ln 1845, 1911, and 1957.

From 1729 to 1961,
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there were thirteen occurrences of earthquake damage in

Mexico City, averaging one every eighteen years (Peck 1985).
Although the epicenters of these earthquakes are rarely
under the city, and are indeed often two hundred to four
hundred miles away, Mexico City's quivering soils respond
dispioportionately to the vibrations set off by earthquakes.
The epicenter of the earthquake that began at 7:19
a.m. on September 19, 1985 lay 250 miles to the south and
west of the city, at 17.6 degrees north latitude and 103.5
degrees

west longitude (Fig. 1). There were few immediate

aftershocks, but approximately 36 hours later, on Friday,
the 20th of September, a second earthquake, measuring 7.5,
shook the city.

These two events together are known as the

September 19 earthquake, as the second one is thought to be
an aftershock of the first (Peck 1985).

Damage occurred in

the states of Jalisco, Michoacan, Guerrero, Colima, Morelos,
Oaxaca, Puebla and Mexico (Fig. 1), but by far the most
extensive damage was in Mexico City.

The first earthquake

consisted of two sixteen second thrusts along 150 miles of
the North American Plate, approximately twenty seconds
apart.

The shaking in the city, however, is variously

reported to have lasted from 90 seconds to three full
minutes.

The difference in length of time was caused by

Mexico City's "bowl of jelly" dynamics.

The frequency of

the earthquake vibrations in this particular case,

l

~
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approximately two seconds apart, colnclded wlth the

resonance period of the

~oils

under the center of the city,

which had the effect of amplifying the resonance of the
earthquake vibrations by four or five times (Kerr 1985).
The effect was the same as repeatedly pushing a bowl of
water at exactly the same time that its sloshing moves the
water up one side of the bowl.
Various estimates put the number of buildings
destroyed between 300 and 1000.
reports 200 destroyed.

Degg (1986) conservatively

The number of damaged buildings is

estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000, based on different
criteria for assessing damage.
been highly selective.

The damage appears to have

Buildings between five and fifteen

stories high were especially hard hit, because their
resonance period matched that of the soil on which they were
built, which further amplified the resonance of the ground
tremors.

Shorter buildings in effect "rode out" the

shaking, while taller ones were able to "pass" the
vibrations "up and out."

The five to fifteen story

buildings were tall enough to be shaken but not flexible
enough to throw off the effects.
weze government buildings.

Many of those buildings

All five major hospitals of the

city were badly damaged, three of them totally destroyed.
Aproximately 250 schools were damaged enough to be closed,
leaving one million school children out of school.

The
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central telecommunications facility collapsed.

The computer

center of the Off ice of the Budget was destroyed, causing
the loss of the nation's financial planning records for
1986-87.

A major housing project, Nueva Leon, collapsed,

killing at least one thousand people.
Mexico City has one of the toughest earthquake
building codes in the world, passed in 1977 and based on the
experience of the 1957 earthquake.

However, there ls

serious doubt that these codes were enforced.

Further, the

federal agency established in 1977 to deal with natural
disasters of this sort had been abolished in 1982, as an
austerity move.

Whether the government was simply unlucky

in constructing buildings of five to fifteen stories, or
whether there was corruption in the awarding of building
contracts and the enforcement of the building codes, public
perception was that of government 1neff 1ciency and
malfeasance.
Public disillusionment with the government was
reinforced by the obvious inability of the government to
deal effectively with the emergency.

Offers of relief

assistance came from around the world, but the government
delayed for several days in agreeing to accept this aid.
When it arrived, there were no agencies prepared to
distribute it, and relief agencies told stories of
inexcusable delays and mismanagement.

The United States

28

Congress offered an immediate $25 million, but only $4
million was sent; the government of Mexico delayed so long
in asking for the assistance that its request came six days
after the six-month deadline for such requests.
The extreme centralization of Mexico's resources in
one place makes it especially vulnerable to natural
disasters. At least 70\ of Mexico's financial transactions
occur within Mexico City (Rudolph 1984), and of those, some
80\ occur within Delegac1on cuauhtemoc, a central
administrative district of the city.
major damage from the earthquake.

This district suffered

Of the nation's 500

largest corporations, 71\ have their headquarters in the
Mexico City area

(~xpansion

8/15/84).

Mexico City contains

one-quarter of the nation's eighty million people,
contributes 44\ of the nation's gross domestic product, 50\
of its industrial output, is the central working and living
place of two-thirds of the federal government's workers, and
holds 80\ of the nation's financial assets (ECLA 1985;
Riding 1985).

Approximately two-thirds of the nation's

students go to school in Mexico City.

The earthquake made

clear once again that Mexico's extreme centralization needs
to be addressed.

Public commentary both within and outside

of the country strongly voiced the opinion that Mexico needs
to decentralize, and placed the responsibility for that
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decentralization squarely with the federal government (WSJ
10/4/85).
However, there are very real reasons that this
concentration of population and resources has developed in
Mexico, reasons which cannot be counterweighed by government
edict.

Among those reasons are historical development,

industrial infrastructure, and capital concentration.

Like

many newly industrialized countries that have experienced
rapid growth since mid-century, Mexico's extreme
centralization is closely tied to the logic and needs of
capital accumulation.

The results have been a city that

Alan Riding (1985) calls a "magnet and a monster."
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE GROWTH OF THE CITY

There is a close correspondence between the growth of
Mexico City's population and the growth of the nation's
economy.

The annual average growth rate of the economy of

Mexico from 1940 to 1950 was 6.9\ while the growth rate of
Mexico City was 5.4\ per year.

During that decade,

1,385,000 people moved to Mexico City (Pommier 1982).
similar pattern has held for every decade since then
(Pommier 1982).

If Mexico City reaches its expected

population of 32 million by the year 2000, lt will have
grown 1001\ between 1950 and 2000 (Brunn 1983).

A
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until the 1960's, Mexico City was virtually synonymous
with the Federal District, as the entire city was within the
boundaries of the District (Fig. 2).

However, since the

late 1960's, most of Mexico City's growth has been in the
municipalities surrounding the district that lie within the
state of Mexico (Fig. 2).

The population growth of the

surrounding munlclpalltles has been nothing short of
phenomenal (Table I) and continues unabated.
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TABLE I
POPULATION WITHIN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND

MUNICIPALITIES OF THE STATE OF MEXICO
Year

Federal District

1900
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1982

344,700
661,700
1,000,000
1,800,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
7,000,000
9,000,000
9,200,000

Municipalities
000
000
000
000
000
230,000
1,800,000
5,500,000
7,Q00,000

(Sources: Alvarez 1985; Iracheta 1982; Pommier 1982;
I. Scott 1982)
the migration has been, and continues to be, the rural
population, and the goals are jobs, a piece of land, and a
better life.
The growth of the city can be described as a race
between the rich, the poor and the rapidly growing middle
class.

Durinq the decades between 1940 and 1960, the bulk

of the new jobs in Mexico City were in construction (Pommier
1982).

Land speculation was uncontrolled and as a result,

the city's growth has been erratic, developing mismatched
enclaves of the very rich and the very poor.

Shopping malls

are mixed with industrial areas, and both are interspersed
with squatter settlements and idle land.

The government has

tended to endorse the land grab after the fact.

It provides

basic services to commercial and residential developments .of
the middle classes and the developers, and "regularizes"
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(makes legal) land holdings by squatters.

Recently,

however, the government has changed its policy.

Its Urban

Development Plan of 1980 stipulates that no further
settlements will be regularized and that by 1988 all illegal
settlements in Mexico City (proper) will be shut down
(Pommier 1982).

Though there has been some question as to

the effectiveness of this program (Ward 1985), the expulsion
of poor squatters has been credited for at least part of the
phenomenal growth of the municipalities surrounding the city
(Fig. 2; Table I).

Nezahualcoyotl, one of Mexico City's

most famous squatter settlements (Fig. 2), has grown to a
population of 3 million since 1960 and in the year 1976-77,
experienced a 500\ rise in rents (Moreno Toscano 1982).

It

ls now possible to speak of the "marginated of Neza," or

those squatters who are too poor to live in a rapidly
growing settlement and who therefore must live even farther
out.
In 1970, the federal government consolidated sevezal
separate administrative units within the Federal District
into Mexico City, and to date the 1970 boundaries constitute
Mexico City "proper" (Fig. 2).

The government has virtually

ignored the municipalities surrounding the city, within and
outside the Federal District.

The result ls that there are

two basic governments administering Mexico City: the federal
government within the Federal District, and the state of
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Mexico outside the Federal District boundaries.
those two divisions are

dozen~

Within

of municipalities.

Every

day, millions of people must negotiate among separate bus
systems to get from their homes to their jobs.

They must

apply to several different government agencies for social
benefits, or permits and licenses; the provision of basic
services such as water, sewers and electricity is divided
between dozens of municipal units.
In the urban setting, the relationship of the urban
poor to the government ls a complex one of demand-making and
accomodatlon between popular organizations and the federal
bureaucracy (Castells 1982; Cornelius 1974; Ward 1986).
Essentially, the poor must spend years petitioning,
organizing, sitting-in at offices and repeatedly visiting
political headquarters in order to obtain basic services.
None of this is a serious challenge to the government's
central authority, however, and bureaus and government
workers play one poor neighborhood against another,
enriching themselves from bribes.

Eventually neighborhoods

do get their services, ln exchange for which they promise to
support Mexico's one political party.

Thus, where there ls

an appearance of radical protest and organizing ln the form
of the many marches, demonstrations and sit-lns that the
working poor must make, the reality is that this is the only
way within the system to obtain necessary services.

This
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system also means that the government does no planning or

managing, and provides no leadership; it only responds to
crises and demands.
Ironically, the federal government's attempts at
decentralization have caused much of this chaos.

Realizing

as early as 1954 that the city needed to be decentralized,
the federal government, in one of its industrial promotion
plans, established tax breaks for industries that located
outside of the Federal District (Pommier 1982).

Industries

began locating just outside the Federal District boundaries
in order 'to gain the tax exemption while staying close to
the nation's economic center.

They took with them the

inevitable squatter settlements of newly arrived migrants
seeking industrial jobs.

In addition, the act of setting

boundaries around the growing municipalities stimulated
intense land speculation within the new city limits while
squatter settlements sprang up just beyond the municipal
boundaries, where land was cheaper.

Thus the government's

attempts at decentralization have had the effect of
abandoning responsibility for major sections of what
operates as one labor and consumer market (Moreno Toscano
1982; Pommier 1982).
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THE GARMENT DISTRICT OF MEXICO CITY
Mexico's economic growth was originally based on a
policy of substitution of locally-produced goods for
imported consumer goods, for sale to the national market
(Dominguez 1982).

Light industry such as the garment

industry were especially encouraged (Pommier 1982).
Although there had been apparel shops and textile industries
in Mexico for many years

(El_J?_t~.

10/9/85; Ramos 1986), the

real time of "take off" for the garment industry was the
mid-1940's (Alonso 1983; Pommier 1982).

This explains why

the garment district of Mexico City is located so close to
the center of the city, almost side-by-side with the
nation's federal buildings (Fig. 3; Table II).

The apparel

industry needs to. be centralized, because of its complex web

of contract relationships and network of specialized
businesses.

In 1940, the city was very much smaller than it

was in 1985, and government and f inanclal resources for
industrial centers such as the garment district were
available only in the center of the city.

over the last 45

years, the nation's industrial policy has shifted towards
favoring more advanced technology, and for a number of

reasons, hard times have hit the garment industry (Chapter
V).

In addition, other uses for the central area compete

with the garment district.

The federal government has made

it a priority to move industry and some types of commerce
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TABLE II
SITES OF LABOR CONFLICTS, BY LOCATION
AND NAME OF BUSINESS
~it~

t,ocat ion and Name of Bus ines~.

1.

138-164 San Antonio Agad.
Dimension Weld, Topeka,
Amal, Carnival, Le Petit, Creaclones Lody, Baby

2.

San Antonio Abad and Jose T. Cuellar Streets. The
encampment of the costureras.
186 Manuel J. Othon. Kayser.
26 Agustin Delgado. No name given for shop.
75 Clavijero. Pascual Bottling Company.
260 Garcia Diego. RopaMex.
Bolivar and Botur1ni Streets. Pantalones Ideal.
Bolivar and Aleman Streets. Deval.
80 Eje Lazlo Cardenas. No name given for shop.
55 Izazaga street. Hiss Universe.
175 20th de Novlembre. Plamonte.
137 Izazaga. Confecciones Yanet.
151 20th de Noviembre. D'Galia.
130 Nezahualcoyotl. Sisl.
Alarcon Street. No name given for shop.
Doblado Street. No name given for shop.
J. J. Herrero Street. No name given for shop.
Bellssarlo Domingo and Rep. of Chile. Nueva York.
87 Peru Street. No name given for shop.
Rep. of Ecuador Street. Star Dance.
77 Rep. of Ecuador. Haquilas Serrat
153 Palma Norte. Gales Shirts.

Duy.
3.
4.
5.
6•

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

(See Appendix A)
out of the center of the city ln order to make the
historical center more attractive for business and finance,
government, and tourism.

However, the garment district

lingers on, through inertia, a kind of seedy monument to

Mexico's economic take-off.
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One feature of the Center and the San Antonio Abad

(Colonia Translto) reg1on5, which make up the garment
district (Fig. 3), is the mixture of residential, commercial
and industrial uses, and the variety of types of shops

within the districts.

Sewing shops are often located on the

second floor of buildings used for other purposes (Figs. 4
and 5).

Heavy sewing machinery located on the upper floors

of buildings originally built for housing and small shops
probably contributed to the collapse of the buildings.
Shops run the gamut from very small shops (Fig. 6) to

several mid-sized shops in one building (Fig. 7), to large
modern industrial buildings (Fig. 8).

In addition, the

shops do not make fine distinctions between types of
commercial activity.

A very common sign in these areas

reads "clothing, by the piece or wholesale" (Fig. 9).

These

small shops are probably the source of much of the
contracting from the central district, and the sight of
small contractors delivering their finished goods is also
not uncommon in this district (Fig. 10).
Garment factories often appear over clothing stores
(Fig. 11).

Where clothing stores show up as retail outlets

on the first floors of a district, one can surmise that
there is a good chance of finding sewing shops above at
least some of them.

In the La Lagunilla subarea of the

center (Fig. 3), Levi de Lopez (1981) found that clothlnq
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stores made up the largest number of commercial enterprises

of the subarea, amounting to 28\ of the establishments.

rt

is not surprising, then, to find several of the actions of

the costureras after the earthquake occurred in this same
area (Fig. 3; Table II).
Mexico's garment industry has a great variety of
workshops and factories, in size, in number of employees,
type of equipment, and type of garments produced.

It is

made up of "a long chain of subcontractors" which piece out
work as far down as the individual worker in her squatter
settlement home (Alonso 1983).

The majority of these shops

are clandestine, or illegal, unregistered shops.

The

clandestine nature of the apparel industry in Mexico is one
of its primary features.

The official figures for

employment in the garment industry run around 102,000120,000 (INEGI 1984, 1986; Perez Sanroman 1986; Saenger
1986), and yet the estimated figure for the actual number of
women employed in garment factories in Mexico is
consistently reported to be 700,000 (El Ola 6/15/86).
Approximately 50\ of these women work in clandestine
factories, which make up 80\ of the garment shops in Mexico
(Uno Has Uno 10/18/85).

These shops do not pay minimum

wages, Social Security or any other benefits to which
workers are entitled under the Mexican Labor Law, and they
do not meet minimum standards of health and safety in their
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working conditions.

"Clandestine" does not mean invisible,

it only means unregistered.

Many of the shops shown in

Flgs. 4-11 are probably "clandestine," though clearly they
are visible and their existence must have been known to many
thousands of people.
Clandestine shops keep wages low even in the
registered factories.

At a time when legal minimum wages

was 20,000 pesos per week (1985-86), the costureras were
earning between 5,000 to 10,000.

5

Garment workers as a

percent of all textile workers do not do well.

In 1970,

clothing workers were 41.1\ of the overall textile industry,
but earned 35.7\ of its wages.

!.

In 1984, clothing workers

were 42.8\ of the overall textile industry, but earned 37.2\
of its wages (INEGI 1986).

These figures only measure the

official gap between clothing workers' earnings and their
representation in the industry.

If the estimated 600,000

other garment workers were added into these figures, the gap
between employment and wages would widen considerably.
Added to this is the indication that garment working is one
of the most important sources of income for working women in
Mexico (Durand 1977;

~~

Jornada 10/12/85).

It appears that

if nothing else, sheer numbers are keeping the wages of

garment workers low.
One of the most important changes in the district as a
result of the labor conflict after the earthquake was that
I
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the costureras were able to establish a place of their own

for the Union's headquarters.

This location is across the

street from one of the most badly damaged buildings of the
garment district, known as the "building of tombs" (Fig. 3,
Site 1; Fig. 12).

This ls where the first confrontations

between the owners, the Army and the garment workers took
place (Appendix A).

This space of one-half block was

granted to the Union for six months, in exchange for
dismantling their encampment, which had occupied the middle
of

d

mJJor highway for two months (Fig. 3, Site 2).

The

Union has been using the tents from that encampment for its
headquarters (Fig. 13).

As of March, 1987, the Union had

been in its space for eighteen months and the owner of the
p1upcLty was requesting its return.

Government bureaus

involved with the garment district were supporting the owner
in that request.

The costureras feel that their removal

from that space would be a psychological blow to their
movement from which they could hardly recover.

They have

offered to buy the property, putting up half the money if
the federal government will put up the other half.
The importance of maintaining that specific place
cannot be discounted as part of the power of the garment
workers' movement.

For the first time in Mexico's history,

thcic exists a physical space in the garment district for

women workers, space that ls controlled by women, where they
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can meet, organize, learn, and work together.

It has been

vitally important for the movement that the symbols of their
struggle be visible: that they are still "encamped," so to
speak, in front of a building where hundreds of women died
and where they first faced armed soldiers and where they
made their first hand-painted signs.

over time, however, it

has become necessary to obtain a more secure tenure in the
garment district.

Thus, the Union has been slowly but

purposefully adding on to its physical "plant."

"With every

impLovcmcnt and every building project, our presence here is
more secure" (International Bulletin 1987: 5).

Plans are

underway for primary and secondary schools for Union
members, a childcare center and a kitchen, all at the San
Antonio Abad location.

If it ls successfully evicted from

this place without finding a new location that is as useful
and emotionally powerful as the present one, the Union will
have a very dlff lcult time surviving.

That fact has not

been lost on the Union's subverters, and ln many ways the
struggle has come down to a fight over the control of a
small amount of space in the center of the garment district.
Under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, circumstances
that require a tremendous toll of energy, time and money,
the Union ls creating on a daily basis a physical presence,
a presence that slgnlfles a new social reality in the
district.

The tiny toehold that the Union has carved out in
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the structure of the garment district is unique, important

and fragile.

CHAPTER III
THE WEAKENING OF A POLITICAL BARGAIN
The conflict that erupted in the garment district of
Mexico City after the earthquake must be understood in light
of Mexico's fundamental political bargain between government

and labor: labor will curtail its demands in exchange for

economic prosperity.

That bargain amounts to institutional

conflict described by Edwards (1982), since there are a host

of institutions and rules, written and understood,
controlling labor in Mexico.

Those rules in a sense "laid

the ground" for the outbreak of conflict after the
earthquake.

Labor as a class ls tightly woven into Mexico's

political system precisely to keep it powerless, and the
actions of the costureras were taken within the context of
thal powerlessness.

Their actions represent both a

reinforcement of the bargain and a challenge to it.

The

bargain has roots in the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917,
and the accomodatlon between government and labor that came
out of the post-Revolutionary period of 1920-1940.

This

historical accomodatlon permeated the dissention within the
9"1Lmcul district after the earthquake and must be explored

in order to understand the effects of the earthquake.

l
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REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS
Mexico's Revolution was not a revolution as much as it
was a civil war.

It began as a middle class movement for

democratic reforms and was joined by landless peasants
seeking land.

Thirty-five years of the dictatorship of

Porfirio Diaz (the Porfirlato of 1876 to 1910) had radically
altered the structure of economic and social relations in
Mexico.

The landed estates had been converted into

commercial agricultural enterprises (sometimes forcibly);
the rural indigenous peoples had lost their traditional
landholdings and were converted to debt peons on the
commercial estates; a small middle class based on land,
f lnance and commerce emerged; and the economy grew rapidly

under the stimulus of foreign capital.

The importance of

the penetration of Mexico's economy by foreign capitalists
cannot be underestimated, as nationalism was the ideology of
the Revolution.

By the time of the Revolution, foreign,

mostly U.S., capitalists owned Mexico's railroads, its
textile mills, its steel plants, its electrical utilities,
its oil-producing facilities, its banks, and a good deal of
the commercial agricultural sector.
A portion of the urban and liberal sectors came to
articulate the basic platform of the Revolution: land
reform, worker's rights, and a secular state.

The unity of

the Revolution, however, was stronger on the basis of what

l
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it was against than what it was for.

The middle classes,

the peasants and the urban laborers united against the
military, the landowners, the bankers and the Church, and
eventually they emerged victorious.

There is no doubt that

there were several gains from the Revolution written into
the Constitution of 1917: universal suffrage, an end to debt
bondage, land reform, an end to foreign ownership of Mexican
resources, and the most progressive labor legislation in the
world of its time (Hamilton 1982).
Nevertheless, one basic contradiction emerged from the
Revolution and the post-Revolutionary period (1920-1940).
The Constitution of 1917 gave the state the task of
protecting and furthering the revolutionary goals of the
poor and the workers, while at the same time protecting the
Mexican economy, i.e., the nation's capitalists, from
foreign domination.

To accomplish these ends, a great deal

of political power was placed in the hands of the President,
and as a check, presidential terms were set for six years
with no re-election.

However, immediately after the

Revolution, the nation was bankrupt, the state had no
effective power with which to carry out its charge, the
peasants were demanding that land reform be carried out
immediately, the commercial classes were withholding their
investments and foreign capitalists were attempting to
reassert their interests.

The government moved to put down

1
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labor and peasant agitation, and also nationalized the

formerly foreign-owned

~ectox

of the economy, which was, in

effect, all of Mexico's infrastructure.

6

The state was then

in the position of being on the one hand the protector of
the nation's workers and the implementer of the land reform
program, and on the other hand the protector of Hexlco's
national capitalists and the owner of the nation's major
infrastructure.

This infrastructure had to be operated

prof ltably, and for the purpose of assisting the capital
classes to increase their, and presumably the nation's,
wealth.

In order to accomodate this basic conflict of
interest, the state created, by flat, Mexico's one political
party, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) in which
the peasants and the working class were firmly entrenched,
though divided from each other into separate organizations.
The workers belong to the CTH, the Congress of Mexican
Workers, and the peasants belong to the CNC, the National
Peasant Confederatlon. 7 The purpose of this was not to
implement worker and peasant demands, though the rhetoric of
the Revolution legitimized the move.

The purpose was to

subordinate the urban workers and rural peasants to the
interests of state and national capital (Cockcroft 1983;
Hamilton 1982; Hodges 1983; Riding 1985).
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Dominguez (1982) has described Mexico's basic

accomodatlon between the state, the peasants and the workers
as a "social bargain," which has four parts.

The state ls

the ultimate arbiter, to which all sectors, even those
outside the official political party, have access to some
degree; all sectors support the system, even if they lose in
the short run, for eventually the state works to accomodate
everyone, though to a greater or lesser degree.

The goal of

the alliance ls rapid economic growth, based on industry and
national capitalism.

The state will distribute the wealth,

in return for which labor and the poor will curtail their
demands.

Finally, the ideology of the Revolution, i.e.,

nationalism, economic growth, land reform, state ownership
of key resources, and a secular state, permeates all public
discourse and state action.

Peter Ward (1986) calls this

bargain "incluslonary authoritarianism."

The state does not

hesitate to use force and repression to maintain the
nation's "unity," but lt prefers to act as the generous
provider of benefits and favors (Ward 1986).
THE STATE AS PROTECTOR OF LABOR

The institutional means of controlling labor ls the
incorporation of the CTH into the PRI, and incorporation of
a specifically pro-labor stance into Mexico's constitution.
Mexico has some of the most progressive labor legislation in

I

l
I

I
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'

the modern world.

I

s/he is entitled to three months' severance pay plus twelve

For example, when a worker is laid off,

'

days for every year worked.
1

Overtime ls paid at twice the

hourly rate, and ls limited to three days per week.
Security ls not paid by workers but by employers.

Social
Workers

are entitled to two weeks' vacation pay and a Christmas
bonus.

Women and men are entitled to equal wages

(~l

Dia

10/21/85).

The reality, of course, ls much different.

The law

weakens workers' rights by carefully dividing workers into
different categories, with different pay scales and rights
according to classification.

Manual laborers have fewer

benefits and earn substantially less than "professional" or
skilled workers..

Workers in cooperatives cannot strike,

because in theory they own the business for which they work.
Workers in the nationalized sector have limited rights to
strike, because they are public employees.

Workers in the

massive federal bureaucracy cannot join unions at all, but
do have an organization which is part of the PRI, and
amounts to what Hodges (1983) has called the "fourth class"
in the Mexican political system.

There are dozens of

categories of workers even within the union system:
conf ldential employees, minor supervisory and off Ice
workers, permanent employees, temporary employees, etc.
(Schlagheck 1980).

These categories are determined by the

I
I

I
I
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Constitution and subsequent labor law and workers are told
upon hiring which union they belong to.

Workers cannot

chose their own union, and they cannot form company unions,_
or unions across broad categories of skill or employment.
Further, certain social benefits are handed out by
employment category.

For example, starting in the 1950's,

titles to land in squatter settlements were given out not by
membership in a community, but by categories of employment-to teachers, railroad workers, bureaucrats, journalists, and
electrical workers (Moreno Toscano 1982).

Not all workers

belong to the Social Security system (ISS) or the state
housing program (INFONAVIT).

Membership in CONASUPO, the

federal program of food subsidies, which was meant for the
poor, comes with membership in several middle class and
professional unions.
Because labor ls so closely woven into Mexico's
political system, there are a plethora of agencies dealing
specifically with labor issues within the federal
government, most of which have CTM representatives within
them.

Among these are the National Tripartite Commission,

the National Joint Wage Protection Committee, the National
Development and Guarantee Fund for Workers' Consumption, the
National Labor Information and statistics Center, the
National Institute of Labor Studies and Labor Legislation,
and the National Minimum Wage Commission (Looney 1985).

At
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the same time, the federal government operates labor courts,
or boards of concillation, to arbitrate disputes between
management and labor.

These courts are not independent

adjudicators, but are made up of representatives from
management, labor and the federal government.

considering

the close ties between labor and the dominant political
party, management and owners regard these courts as biased
ln favor of labor (Schlagheck 1980), and indeed it appears
that the courts are the tool that the federal government
uses to promote labor rights in Mexico.

However, all unions

must register their intent to strike with the court of their
jurisdiction, and the majority of these strikes never occur,
because the court settles the issues beforehand (Schlagheck
1980).

If workers refuse to accept the arbitration decision

of the court, their contract is terminated and management
can hire replacements in their stead.

If management refuses

to abide by the decision, the contract is terminated and the
workers are let go, although with compensation.

Given the

fact that there ls little attempt at separation of powers in
Mexico and that political pressure can be applied to
Mexico's judicial system, there is no neutral and
independent adjudicator to whom parties ln conflict can turn
to solve problems.

All labor conflicts in Mexico are solved

politically, with the government playing a central role.

1
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I
LABOR UNIONS IM THE GARMENT DISTRICT

I
I

Government labor unions play an important role in the
control of the labor force ln the garment district by

!

selling labor contracts, and labor peace, to shop owners in
I

return for bribes.

The tool of this system ls the contrato

blanco, or blank contract, which proves to be a very
flexible means of controlling the workforce.

The vendors of

these contracts are primarily CTH labor bosses known as

charros.

These men have never been garment workers, which

is a job overwhelmingly done by women.

Instead, they are

professional labor bosses, making a career out of selling

protection, 1.e., protecting the owners from legitimate
organizing.

They collect monthly fees from owners for

keeping several blank contracts in their desk drawers
covering the workers of specific factories, contracts which
can be filled in later if necessary.

The terms of these

contracts are never specified, but they are used to keep any
attempts at legitimate union organizing out of the factory,
as only one union is allowed per shop.

Contracts are often

renewed every month or three months, in order to keep
workers from gaining any seniority with a shop.

Many times

the costureras know nothing about their supposed membership
ln these unions.

One costurera sald, "I never met the union

leader, but the owners told me to bring two pictures of
myself and said I was in a union." (La Jornada 10/26/85)
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There were an estimated 5,000 of these ephemeral contracts
and contracts of protection covering the shops of the
garment district of Mexico City on the day of the earthquake
(La Jornada, 10/10/85).
Traffic in labor contracts can be quite lucrative.
According to Proceso (11/4/85), the bearer of the contract
ls the secretary-general of the union and has the ability to
appoint the person who represents him in the factory.

Each

contract holder has the ability to call a strike, fix salary
percentages, and write up worker demands.
prerogative not to do the above.

Each also has the

The labor boss who

administers the contract can earn millions of pesos, taking
in as much as 2,000 pesos per month per worker, as the

owners often f lnd lt easier and less expensive to pay of£
the labor boss than to raise salaries to minimum wages.
The labor bosses are part and parcel of the the PRI.
Hilda Anderson, the head of the women's section of the CTH,
ls also an official of the PRI and a representatlve in
Congress.

It is small wonder, then, that Fidel Velazquez,

the head of the CTH, called upon to make a show of support
for the costureras after their conditions had been revealed,
condemned the "monstrous collusion" between labor leaders,
government officials, and shop owners, and fired five CTH
officials.

He was right about the monstrous collusion, of

which his organization was no small part, but he had no
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intention of changing the practices.

When Secretary of

Labor Farell signed the registration for the Union, he
warned the costureras that they had to compete with 500
other labor unions for contracts, putting the Union on
notice that in effect, he was allowing the ephemeral
contracts to continue to exist.
GOVERNMENT AND COSTURERAS IN CONFLICT

The "state" in Mexico is not the military, it is not a
puppet of foreign governments and it is not identical with
big business.

The "state" in Mexico ls a very strong

executive, three to four million federal workers (out of a
population of 80 million), and a political party with no
independent powers.

Because the government has deliberately

fostered the image that it is the benevolent source of all
benef lts and the means by which Mexico's political unity is
maintained, all sectors of Mexico's population look to the
central government for support.

This is one of the reasons

that when the costureras had a conflict with the shop owners
in the garment district, they marched on the Presidential
Palace in anger.

By doing so, they implicitly reinforced

Mexico's "incluslonary authoritarianism."

A truly

revolutionary change would have been to have formed a union
and begun

stri~es

and negotiations without seeking

registration or legltlmlzatlon from the federal government.

1
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To have done so, however, would have been to have courted
violent repression, including the assassination of the
Union's organizers (WSJ 10/4/85).

Marching on the

Presidential Palace did not fundmentally question the
authority of the central government over labor or labor
disputes; it was a rational act on the part of the
costureras ln light of Mexico's political system.
Another reason that the garment workers turned their
labor dispute into political protest was that they did have
a legitimate, speclflc grievance against the government, and
that was the government's role in labor unions.

In this

respect, their demands did represent fundamental social
change in Mexico, since independent unions are rare, the
last ones having been formed among automobile industries
which were growing rapidly during the late 1960's and early
1970's as a result of U.

s. investments.

Independent labor

unions are a fundamental challenge to Mexico's political
system, and by demanding to have an independent union, the
costureras were publicly condemning the government's twoslded policy toward labor: pro-labor rhetoric and ironflsted control of labor.

It is not surprising, therefore,

that CTH labor unions have been as strong or stronger in
f

lghting the Union as the shop owners have been.
As early as December, 1985, the CTM unions, in

collusion with the owners, openly announced that they
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intended to "disappear" the Union (Uno Has Uno 12/31/85).
Their tactics have included threatening and attacking women
as they voted, and ballot-box stuffing.

They have been

aided by both owners and government officials in these
efforts.

After warning the Union that it would have to

compete with 500 other unions, Secretary of Labor Farell has
refused to give the Union a list of those 500 other unions,
or even a list of unions at factories with 500 or more
workers (Uno Has Uno 4/14/86).

Clearly, the government

recognized the basic challenge to its authority that the
Union represents and acted accordingly.

To the extent that

the Union can maintain its status as an independent union,
it represents a basic political change in Mexico.
Ironically, the Union relies to a certain extent on the
government to help maintain that independent status.

For

example, the Union is negotiating with government officials
for support in staying at its present location.
Clearly, the earthquake happened within a context of
complex institutional relationships that governed the dayto-day operations of the city and the garment district.
Those relationships did not change simply as a result of the
earthquake, but were part of the response patterns of the
people damaged by the earthquake.

The earthquake was, in a

sense, a new, unforeseen element ln the weaving of the
social web.

Social evolutionary process, like natural
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evolutionary process, does not waste what has gone before,
but builds on it.

CHAPTER IV
THE COSTURERAS AND THE CRISIS

The position of the garment workers after the
earthquake needs to be understood in light of two dominant
facts in Mexico's development.

The first is the emergence

of a class of working poor in Mexico, and especially Mexico
City.

The second ls the depth of the economic crisis which

the nation was suffering, and its impact on Mexico's working
poor.

on the day of the earthquake, Mexico was essentially

bankrupt, having the second highest foreign debt in the
world, $97 billion.

Debt service was running at $10 billion

annually (about $900 million per month), inflation was
running at around 50-60\ a year, capital flight was
taking $3 billion to $6 billion a year out of the country,
unemployment was 16\ by off lcial figures (up from 8\ in
1980), and the buying power of Mexico's 24 million workers
had decreased 40\ since 1982 (NYT 10/23/86).

Ironically,

the crisis comes after forty years of rapid economic and
industrial growth.

The Mexican economy has registered

average annual growth rates of approximately 6\ for the last
forty years (Looney 1985).

That growth brought fundamental

social change in Mexico, creating a class of urban working
poor, of whom the costureras are the epitome, and a growing
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middle class whose economic

positio~

has been extremely

fragile as a result of the economic crisis.

By sorting out

the underlying "grid" of Mexico's economic growth since the
early 1940's, it will be possible to see that the garment
workers were in a very precarious position on the day of the
earthquake, a position that made them both vulnerable to the
damage of the earthquake, and yet able to take advantage of
the crisis to demand change.
THE ECONOMIC "MIRACLE"
In 1940, the turmoil of the post-Revolutionary period
had ended, imports from industrial countries were
unavailable because World War II was in progress, and demand
for Mexican raw materials by the warring nations was at an
all-time high.

The Mexican economy went into its "take-off"

stage and has registered growth rates which have been
referred to as the Mexican "miracle" (Riding 1985; Ward
1986).

Mexico City has been the center of most of the

investment, and most of the industrial, economic and
population growth.

The economic growth has been

accomplished through rapid industrialization, neglect of
agriculture, and massive demographic shifts.
From Agriculture to Industry
Employment and production in agriculture have declined
considerably since 1940, while population has grown
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explosively, and employment in industry and services rose
proportionately (Table III).

In 1940, 65\ of Mexico's

population was rural, living in centers of less than 2,500;
by 1980, 65\ of the population was urban (I. Scott 1982).
By 1980, Mexico ranked as one of the largest and wealthiest
nations of the world.

It is fourteenth in size, eleventh ln

population, and had the fifteenth largest economy of 1980
(Rudolph 1984).

Its gross domestic production of $1,546 per

capita in 1983 (Rudolph 1984) is respectable for a newly
industrialized nation.
TABLE I I I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY, 1940-1980

1940

1980

Population

20 million

72 million

Employment
Agriculture
Industry
Services

70\
15\
15\

32\
26\
42\

Gross Domestic Product
(in 1975 pesos)
114 million
\ of GDP by Sector
Agriculture
Industry
Services

21\
24\
55\

1.293 billion
9\

39\
52\

(Source: Looney 1985)
The engine of this economic growth was industry, which
was stimulated by several federal policies.

The government

invested heavily in transportation and communications,
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building up an infrastructure for industrial production,

Tariff5 were

almost all of it located in Mexico City.

placed on imported consumer goods, subsidies and tax
incentives were offered to Mexican businesses, and tax rates
on profits were kept low in order to stimulate substitution
of locally produced goods for imported consumer goods.
These collective actions were the basis of Mexico's "import
substitution" policy, which has been the nation's basic
economic model for growth over the last forty years.

As

part of this model, foreign investment in Mexican
corporations was kept to less than 49\, although this was
often subverted.

Finally, federal investment in the

agricultural sector was cut considerably, while federal
subsidies of social programs, including those for schools,
clinics and food subsidies, were expanded.
Land Reform and the Working Poor
Over the last forty years, the rural poor have become
the urban poor, who are also the reserve army of labor so
necessary to Mexico's economic expansion.

This process ls

the "proletarianization" of Mexico's population, a process
which created a class of working poor.

Land reform, which

was meant to break up large estates and distribute land to
peasants and which was one of the basic tenants of the
RP.volution, oddly enough played a crucial role in creating a
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large base of unemployed rural poor, who have been the
source of Mexico's urban industrial and service workers.
First, the abolition of debt peonage created the first
opportunity in hundreds of years for peasants to move off
the land (Pommier 1982).

Second, the land reform program

was never fully implemented, and has effectively ended.
Distribution of land was always dependent on the commitment
of individual administrations to the policy, and Mexico does
not have an abundance of arable land in its treasury of
natural resources.

The large estates in the northern

regions of the nation were left alone by administrations
which were ideologically close to the large landowners, and
although government investment in agriculture has decreased
since 1940, that investment has been almost entirely in
irrigation of Mexico's northern regions.

Seventy years

after promising land reform, post-Revolutionary Mexico has a
landholding pattern in which 74\ of the farms hold 1.6\ of
the farmed area while 7\ of the holdings over 100 hectares
hold 95\ of the farmed area (Looney 1985).

The promise of

land reform, still part of the social bargain of Mexico,
turned out to be an empty promise.
Under the Cardenas administration of the 1930's, which
was more committed to land reform than any other
administration, rural peasants were not given full title to
their land, but held it communally, based on the traditional

1
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Indian communal landholding patterns.

These ejidos were

intended to protect peasants from exploitation, since the
land was never to be sold or divided.

As

a further

"protection," the ejidal organizations were tied into the
PRI, through the peasant organizations.

The reality of this

form of land distribution, however, meant that land owned
previously by private owners stayed in private hands (if it
'Wr.1~•

not con£ !seated for land reform), but land turned over

to peasants could never be individually held.

At the same

time, within Mexico City, the Cardenas administration
developed a policy of legalizing titles to property held by
squatters, a policy which was later expanded by other
administrations.

A rural peasant was more likely eventually

to own his or her own piece of land in the city of Mexico
City than s/he ever would in the rural areas (Moreno Toscano
1982).

These factors provided the "push" from the land, and

jobs and social benefits within the cities, especially
Mcxi~o

City, became the "pull."

The Working Poor and the "Miracle"
By 1980, only 30\ of the population of Mexico City
owned land (Moreno Toscano 1982).

In 1982, in the Mexico

City metropolitan area, 40\ of the population received no
health care, 51\ were without running water in their homes,
22.6\ were unable to satisfy their basic needs, and some
800,000 families (3,000,000 people) were without housing
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(Riding 1985).

Residents of the metropolitan area, however,

are better off by most social indicators than most of the
rest of the country (Ward 1986).
Further, there ls a wide gap between the earnings of
the rich and the poor, and that gap has been widening during
the years of the "miracle."

In 1950, the wealthiest 5\ of

the population had an income 22 times larger than the
poorest 10\ of the population; in 1977, it was 47 times
greater (Rudolph 1984).

In 1977, the wealthiest 10\ of the

population received 38\ of the national income, while the
poorest 10\ earned 1\ of the nation's income (Rudolph 1984).
The structure of investment helps to explain the
uneven distribution of income in Mexico's economy.
Generally, the greatest investment, and the greatest income,
has been in a very small segment of the economy--the modern,
highly technological sectors, which are capital intensive
and extremely productive, but do not absorb much labor.

An

analysis of the 1965 survey of industry found that overall,
84\ of the firms accounted for only 1.9\ of invested capital
and 3.9\ of production while at the same time 5.7\ of the
firms accounted for 92\ of invested capital and 88.5\ of
production (Alonso 1983).

This means that the vast majority

of Mexico's businesses are small, undercapitalized and not
very productive.

This gap has often been described as the

difference between the "artisan" sector and the modern or

l
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technological or "dynamic" sector (Alonso 1983; Oerossl

1970; Durand 1977).
This pattern holds as true for the garment industry as
it does for all industry in Mexico.

For example, ln 1965,

garment factories made up 13.6\ of industrial plants but
only 2.5\ of investment and 3.6\ of gross production
(Oerossi 1970).

At the same time, 87\ of garment factories

employed less than five people, and another 10\ employed six
to fifty people (Derossi 1970).
The "dual economy" helps to explain why the industrial
sector of the economy has not absorbed its share of labor
(Table III).

The decrease in agricultural employment has

been counterweighed by a greater increase in employment in
services than in industry.

Superiority in productivity of

modern industrial methods has been accomplished through
machinery and capital investment.

Though millions of people

moved to the city in search of industrial jobs, the promised
jobs have not been forthcoming as fast as have the jobseekers.

In 1983, the government of Mexico admitted to an

official figure of 13\ unemployed, but 40\ "underemployed"
(Rudolph 1984).

More telling, however, is the fact that 49\

of the working population of Mexico City earns less than
minimum wages (Riding 1985).
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The Deyelopment of the Crisis
The structural weaknesses of Mexico's economy have
been well identified by analysts (Looney 1985; Riding 1985;
Schlagheck 1980).

First, the government did not finance its

social programs and its infrastructure provision through tax
revenues or by operating its share of the economy
profitably.
abroad.

It financed its spending through borrowing

Second, the tariff protections local capital

enjoyed made Mexican industry weak and non-competitive.
Third, Mexican business has had to finance its growth
through borrowing abroad, and importing capital equipment
and technology.

Thus, the import substitution policy had

the long-term effect of making Mexican capital more
dependent on imports (Looney 1985).

Finally, much of

Mexico's wealth has been plundered by bureaucrats and
wealthy elites and sequestered abroad (Eckstein 1977; Henry
1986; Riding 1985).
By 1977 the strains of too much growth, too much
spending, too much debt and too much capital drain were
seriously affecting the Mexican economy.

In that year, the

peso was devalued and the government began an austerity
program in exchange for an IMF loan.

In that same year,

however, Mexico began to sell its recently discovered vast
reserves of oil, and quickly became the fourth largest
producer of oil in the world (Rudolph 1984).

Export
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earnings rose from $6 billion in 1977 to $19 billion in
1982, 75\ of which was from the sale of oil (Hamilton 1984).

At the same time,- spending on imports rose from $6 billion
in 1977 to $23 billion in 1981 (Hamilton 1984).

Much of

that import was of capital equipment to develop the oil
Industry.

on the basis of projected growth rates of 8-9\

until the end of the century, the government took on a
program of extensive borrowing; foreign debt rose from $34
billion in 1978 to $51 billion in 1980 to $88 billion in
1982, 25\ of which was for PEMEX, the national oil company
(ECLA

1985; Hamilton 1984).

corruption, mismanagement and

capital flight reached epic proportions, while the austerity
measures of the IMF were quietly swept aside (Riding 1985).
In 1981 when the price of oil suddenly dropped, Mexico was

not in a position to weather the contraction.

By 1982,

inflation was running at 100\, and capital flight was
rampant.

From January to March of 1982, $8 billion left the

country (Hamilton 1984).

President Lopez Portillo devalued

the peso early in 1982 and just before he left off ice, in
August of 1982, he nationalized the banks in order to halt
the capital drain.
Oil prices have remained sluggish and Mexico has not
been able to recover from the events of 1982 which have
collectively come to be known as La Crisis.

Emergency loans

from the IMF have helped tide the economy over, and the

73

government of President de la Madrid has held the .nation to
an austerity program that included cuts in social programs
and price rises for basic foodstuffs.

Nevertheless, on the

day of the earthquake, the IMF announced that Mexico was out
of compliance with the austerity program and cancelled the
final installment of a three-year, $3 billion loan.
THE.POSITION OF THE COSTURERAS IN THE GARMENT DISTRICT

In light of Mexico's development and its current
economic crisis, the costureras were in a position of almost
complete powerlessness in the garment district.

They were

subordinated to government labor unions, they were
subordinate to owners, they were hemmed in by inflation,
unemployment and Mexico's skewed distribution of income, and
they were exploited also as women.
The Costureras as a Special case of the Working Poor
One of the primary characteristics of the garment
industry is its reliance on female labor.

The industry has

traditionally relied on female labor precisely because of
its need to hire and fire on short notice.

Women's unpaid

and privatized labor in the domestic sphere of production ls
deemed to have no economic value; they lack access to
education and other resources; their position as mothers
makes them economically vulnerable when there are very young
dependents to take care of, and their competition on the
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labor market has been hampered by deliberate discrimination.
Thus, women make a perfect reserve army of labor to be
called up and disbanded when the industry needs

them~

Several decades of urbanward migration, the emergence of a
class of urban working poor and the advent of La Crisis
meant that there was a large pool of exploitable female
labor ln Hexlco City.

The costureras represented the

epitome of Mexico's class of working poor, and took the jobs
that they did because they had little choice.
The majority of the costureras are young.

A

study by

the Ibero-American University, reported in El Dia
(10/21/85), found that 79\ of the costureras were between
the tl~cu

of 19 and 30, though the costureras reported that

it was becoming increasingly dlff lcult for workers over 25
to obtain work.

The most common age for entry into the

factories is 18 to 20, though a few reported that they did
not start until they were in their early twenties and one
reported that she started at 15 (Costurera Group Interview
1966).

The costureras reported in private interviews that

they thought some of the victims of the earthquake were as
young as 13, though they were not sure because not everyone
knew who was killed, not all the bodies were recovered, and
some young girls added to their age in order to get work.
The Ibero-American University study also found that
48\ of the costureras had not finished primary school.

A
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primary education ls one of the job requirements often
placed on costureras in the more modern factories.

This

distinction, which is not necessary for a repetitive
standardized job, leaves many women at a greater
disadvantage than their skill level would warrant.
The majority of costureras are either single or in
relationships that do not constitute marriage: widowed,
divorced, in free union (Durand 1977).

For all age

categories, the proportion of married costureras is between
8 and 9 percent (Durand 1977).

The Ibero-American

University survey found that 66\ of the costureras were
single mothers (El Dia 10/21/85).
It appears that the majority of the costureras were
born outside of Mexico City and currently live in
municipalities surrounding Mexico City.

This point may be

so commonly understood that its relevance was overlooked by
the several researchers who interviewed the costureras after
the earthquake.

The fact that transportation subsidies and

shorter work days to account for the journey to work became
part of the demands of the Union, however, indicates that
the majority of the workers were residents of the city's
many surrounding municipalities and squatter settlements.
The story of Evangelina Corona, the General Secretary
of the Union, is representative of the costureras.

She was

born in Tlaxcala (Fig. 1) and moved to Mexico City at the
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age of fifteen in order to earn money to send to her family.
After working several jobs as a domestic servant, she began
to work in the clothing factories, and on the day of the
earthquake had worked in them for 22 years.

She never

married but has two daughters, one of whom ls married and
one of whom is finishing high school (Proceso 11/25/85).
Hs. Corona's story ls paralleled by hundreds of other
similar stories.

Though further research needs to be done,

it appears that the garment factories are drawing on a

defined pool of workers precisely because they find that in
their constrained positions as young women with little
education, with children to support alone, recently arrived
ln the city, and intensely poor, these women have little
chol~c

but to take what work, poorly paid and exploitive as

it is, that they can find.

Im1.1led and_ Overt Conflict in the Factories
The position of the costureras in relation to shop
owners was one of almost total powerlessness.

Not only did

they earn low wages for work days of ten to twelve hours,
but there were dally abuses and indignities.

Some owners

docked workers' pay one hour for every minute a worker was
late to arrive to work.

Once a manager made a woman walk in

a small circle for an entire workday for being late to work
(La Jornada 11/30/85).

Bathroom privileges were restricted.

Women had to clean the bathrooms themselves, on their own
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time.

Lunch hours ran from non-existent to half an hour.

Hirings and firings were arbitrary and discriminatory; pay
per piece and production quotas were set entirely by
management.

women could be moved on or off a machine

without notice, which caused workers who had attained high
speeds to start over again on unfamiliar machines.

Workers

could not receive or make telephone calls, and therefore
were out of contact with their children for up to eighteen
hours in a day.

The workers could not call the factory to

report they were sick, but had to go to the factory to ask
for permission to take a sick day.
the health of the workers.
disease were common.

The job was also hard on

Arthritis, blindness and kidney

The most dramatic statement of this

problem was reported by Durand (1977).

The Levi-Strauss

factory Ca large factory, now closed because of the economic
crisis) awarded the title of "Miss Levis" to the most
productive workers of the week, and then used her production
to set the minimum quota for other workers to attain.
However, the winners of the "Miss Levis" title regularly die
early, blind and with kidney disease.
In spite of the obvious odds against them, individual
women over the years had made attempts at organizing against
these conditions.

La Jornada (11/25/85) reported on a study

done at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAH)
regarding organizing attempts by costureras between 1980 and

1
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1985.

The report stated that during this time, 43

complaints were filed with the government against 37 garment
factories.

In addition, the report found that ln at least

seven of the factories affected by the earthquake, the
workers had already begun to organize.

In one factory,

workers struggled for and won the right to have fifteen
minutes to eat lunch and have five minutes added to.the five
minutes per day they were allowed to use the bathroom
(Guerrera Interview 1987).
The response of the owners to worker organizing was
usually immediate and harsh.

Lupe Conde, who worked 20

years in 90 factories because, as she said, she kept trying
to quit, reported that she was blacklisted for several years
by shops in the central district for attempting to organize
the workers at her shop.

As a result she had to take jobs

in the tiny shops in the municipalities (Lovera 1986).
These attempts at organizing in the garment district before
the earthquake show that the implicit conflict of interest
between workers and shop owners was recognized enough to
erupt on its own, though erratically, into overt conflict.
However, most of the women, by their own admission, were
strapped in by daily concerns of taking care of their
families and surviving in Mexico's inflationary climate.
The array of powers against them appeared too overwhelming
for them to demand change, or even envision change.

Still,

"'!

!
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one could argue, as the costureras do, that conditions were
changing in the garment district and workers were beginning
to organize, though at a glacial pace.

The perception of

the costureras ls that the earthquake speeded up and
intensified a pre-existing process of change (Guerrera
Interview 1987).
THE COSTURERAS RESPOND TO THE CRISIS

The most salient feature of the garment workers•
response to the emezgency created by the earthquake is that
it changed over time.

In a sense, there was not one

response but several, as conditions changed.

Their initial

response was one of attempting to rescue, recover and
restore, as social science theory predicts, but because of
the complexity of relations in the garment district, their
actions toward rescue and restoration brought them into
direct conflict with their government and their bosses, and
into a realization of the weakness of their position in the
district.

Their status as Mexico's working poor in a nation

that was bankrupt meant that they were economically very
vulnerable to the loss of their jobs.

On the other hand,

once the walls came down and they had lost their livelihoods
anyway, there was little to restrain them from protest.

As

one woman said in a personal interview, "We were already out
on the streets.

What more could they do to us?" (Costurera
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Group Interview 1986).

Ironically, much of what the

costureras demanded was to be made part of the system of
protection and benefits from which they had been so
thoroughly excluded.
on the day of the earthquake, some of the factories
had started working and some had not.

Many people were

still out on the streets on their way to work when the
earthquake struck.

The immediate events surrounding the

earthquake and the first hours and days after it are
probably lost to academic scrutiny.

Of the four daily

journals that kept the garment district labor struggle alive
in the media for several months, the first to report on the
events was La Jornada on September 28, 1985, nine days after
the earthquake.

The other three did not report on the

events until October 4 or later.
Conflicts broke out over two types of responses: those
in which owners took out their machinery and materials and
either disappeared or relocated, leaving workers fired,
abandoned, or "on vacation", and those ln which owners or
managers forced workers to continue or resume working in
damaged and unsafe buildings (Appendix A).
Responses by the costurereas took two forms.

One was

confrontation with owners, with the soldiers, with
government officials.

Machinery was seized by workers, and

rescue work was carried out by families and friends, in open

1
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violation of the orders of the military authorities.

The

other response was to form cooperatives in order to continue
work.

Several of these were announced in the newspapers,

but only three apparently started within a short time of the
earthquake.

As of March 1987, there were eight operating

cooperatives which grew out of the joblessness left by the
earthquake, at least one of which, for older workers, ls
under the direct organization of the Union (Carrillo
Interview 1987).

However, since the National Clothing

Chamber (a government-mandated trade organization) estimates
that there were 40,000 workers left without jobs (using,
apparently, a formula of 800 shops destroyed and 50 workers
per shop), these eight cooperatives have not been the means
by which workers have successfully responded to the
earthquake.
Public attention to these events was aroused through
the media, primarily through the work of feminist
journalists.

These writers did not just report the events,

but actively participated in the conflicts.

Elena

Poniatowska, a well-known feminist and political writer, was
at Dimension Weld (Fig. 3, Site 1; Appendix A), when the
owner, Elias Serur, attempted to take his machinery out of
the building.

Tensions were mounting, as privately hired

machine operators used their heavy equipment to take out
machinery from the factory, soldiers attempted to keep the
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costureras away from the building, in which dozens of women
were still trapped, and the costureras and their supporters
built a barricade with debris from the fallen buildings in
order to halt the trucks which carried the rescued
materials.

Ms. Ponlatowska crossed into the restricted

area, found Mr. Serur and attempted to interview him.

She

pressed him until he said he would pay the workers for the
days they had worked, but at the same time made threats
against their safety if they continued their barricade.

By

that time, tensions were too high to be stopped and the
"incident" quickly escalated into the first full
confrontation between the military and the costureras, and
is now generally counted as the be91nn1ng of the movement tn
the San Antonio Abad area (Lamas 1986).
With the sudden attention of most of Mexico's public
media on their struggles, the costureras quickly gathered
support.

Active public support came from four main sources.

other labor organizations, such as the union workers as the
Pascual bottling plant, collected food and clothing needed
by workers while they were engaged in pressing their claims
from the government and owners (Fig. 3, Sites 5, 11;
Appendix A).

Feminist organizations, including the Lesbian-

Feminist Marxist-Leninist Study Group from the National
University, and the Feminist Solidarity Committee, took
supplies to costureras and cooked for them and did childcare
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while the women marched, held machinery, and engaged in
negotiations.

The National Front of Democratic Lawyers

offered legal assistance during the first few weeks of the
conflicts.

Members of the Revolutionary Workers' Party

helped organize and support a camp of family members of
costureras who had been killed.
In early October, the efforts of the costureras, their
supporters and families, changed from rescue of bodies, and
spontaneous conflicts with authorities, to organizing.

On

October 2, the La Promotora de Costureras Damnificadas
(Organizing Committee of the Garment Workers Affected by the
Earthquake) was formed.

on October 9, La Union de

Costureras en Lucha (Union of Costureras in Struggle) was
formed by the costureras in the San Antonio Abad region.

On

October 13, La Orqan1zac1on de Costureras del Centro
(Organization of Costureras £tom the Center) was formed
(Appendix B).

After a dramatic all-night meeting, these two

unions joined forces, and the next day, October 18,

they

marched jointly to the Presidential Palace to present their
petition to the President and the Secretary of Labor.

Hore

than a thousand workers from 26 factories marched on the
Presidential Palace, and had to sit in at the offices of the
secretary of Labor almost all day before they got what they
wanted: a recognized, independent union, and a promise of
government assistance in the indemnification proceedings.
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They did not get something of utmost importance to their
struggle--the right to bargain for contracts with the owners
on a company-wide basis, but had to agree to fight for
cont~acts

shop by shop.

This, and Secretary Farell's

indication that he still considered the thousands of paper
contracts ln the garment shops valid, was a setback from the
very beginning.
The next several months were spent primarily on two
major activities: building the union by affiliating new
members and winning contracts in factories, and negotiation
with the government and the National Clothing Chamber for
indemnification for workers who had lost their jobs or their
lives in the earthquake.
In February of 1987, it seemed clear to this writer
that the Union ls involved in a new stage, that of
organizing for a long-term struggle.

Since the first twelve

contracts were signed with owners within the first year
after the earthquake, no new ones have been signed, though
fifteen are being negotiated.

Several owners have closed

down their factories and moved after signing the contracts.
Robert's, a very large factory which was not damaged by the
earthquake but whose 700 workers were the f lrst to aff illate
after the earthquake, has filed a lawsuit against the Union,
claiming that it was illegally registered.

That lawsuit was

l
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filed on Hay 10, 1986 and has taken much of the Union's
attention.
Further, the Union has been unable to extend its
organizing efforts to other parts of the nation.

One of the

first acts of solidarity with the Union occurred when the
Authentic Workers Front, a union of 9arment workers in
Irapuato (Fig. 1), affiliated with the Union.

This allowed

the Union to qualify as a national union, which it needed
for government recognition.

Workers in Veracruz (Fig. 1)

then attempted to affiliate with the Union, but when 75
fired costureras had a sit-down demonstration at the
factory, they were beaten up by 150 armed men hired by CTH
labor bosses.

The Union was unable to send help and the

effort in Veracruz has collapsed.

Lack of time and money

mean that the Union has to focus its efforts in Mexico City.
The Union has sought international support, and it has
been successful to a certain extent.

By June of 1986, the

Feminist Solidarity Committee had collected $22,000 for
support of the costureras, which came from the U.S., Japan,
France, England, Martinique, Venezuela and Canada
Jornada 6/27/86).

(L~

The Union held its first international

exchange in October of 1986, by inviting supporters from the
U.S. to meet with the Union.

Union members traveled to

Detroit for a labor conference in 1986 and members of the
Union met with garment workers from the Philippines in

1l
~
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October of 1986 during a labor conference in Manila.

In

February of 1987, the Union sent a traveling display with
their history in pictures on a tour of the United States.
In addition, the costureras have focused on taking
care of their own ongoing needs.

They bought a house, a few

blocks from Union headquarters, to provide daycare, and
enrolled over one hundred children.

They have also started

a school to raise their literacy levels and to teach
themselves political organizing skills.

These organizing

activities have had to operate in a climate of much less
public attention and support than they had during the crisis
period, an increasing economic crisis which ls forcing
people back into low-wage jobs, and mounting resistance from
owners and government unions.
The long-term battle has yet to be won.

For that

reason, the costureras are beginning to downplay the
importance of the earthquake and to concentrate on getting
support for their struggle against exploitive conditions of
work.

Though the earthquake was tragic, they do not want to

be supported on the basis of that alone.

The real crime, in

their analysis, is continuing exploitation in the garment
factories, earthquake or no earthquake.

This battle ls more

subtle and is therefore harder to win support for, because
it ls not a dramatic headline-making event.

In the minds of

the costureras, however, it is the real struggle.

CHAPTER V
CONFLICT IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
The costureras were not the only people in a
precarious position on the day of the earthquake.

Both the

owners and the government were in difficult straits.

In

1985, 25\ of Mexico's garment factories went bankrupt (Perez
Sanroman 1986).

Most of these failures cannot be ascribed

to the earthquake, but to La crlsls, which hurt the garment
industry as much as the rest of the economy.
the earthquake had a two-sided effect.

once again,

On the one hand, it

hurt businesses already squeezed from several sides, but on
the other it gave them an opportunity to make changes that
they perhaps might not otherwise have made.

The government

was caught wearing many hats, which brought it into conflict
not only with the owners and the garment workers, but
internally, as various government agencies had different
agendas to promote.

In order to understand why the owners

and the government responded to the earthquake ln the way
that they did, it is necessary to analyze the underlying
network of the development of Mexico's garment industry.
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THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN CRISIS

Direct foreign investment in Mexico's apparel industry
is only about 8\ of total investment.

However, because

foreign investment is concentrated in the modern sector that
produces for the lucrative export market, national capital
produces for the internal market, which is very sensitive to
the state of the national economy.

Under pressure from a

weak internal economy and investment from abroad, national
capitalists are left with the choice of either investing ln
modern technology and attempting to compete for the export
market, or breaking down their production into ever smaller
subcontracting units, in order to cut costs.
for the most part, has been the latter.

The choice,

Alonso argues that

it is the investment of foreign capital in Mexico's apparel
industry that causes the "uncontrolled appearance of
thousands of domestic seamstresses in metropolitan Mexico
City" (Alonso 1983: 162).

The affects of the economic

crisis have done the same.
Even by official f 1gures, the textile industry overall
was hurt by the advent of La Crisis.
industry badly.
over

62~,

Inflation hurt the

In 1982, clothing had an inflation rate of .

and in 1983, clothing suffered a whopping 110\

inflation rate

(INEGI 1986).

immediate decline in orders.

This inflation caused an
CANAINTEX (National Textile

Industry Chamber) reported that orders were down 24\ in 1983
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in the textile industry (Expansion 1984).

By 1985,

approximately 40\ of Mexico's textile capacity was idle
(Saenger 1986).

These figures do not state whether they

include clothing as well as fibers and fabrics, but the
clothing industry was hurt as well.

The 25\ of Mexico's

garment manufacturers that went bankrupt in 1985 cannot be
accounted for by the earthquake.

Of the National Clothing

Chamber's 3,200 registered members, 1,300 were damaged or
destroyed, and of these, between 500 and 800 were totally
destroyed (Perez Sanroman 1986).

Saenger (1986) reports

that only 200 garment industries in Mexico City were totally
destroyed by the earthquake and of these, 80\ had reopened
within a few weeks, the majority outside the city center.
Thls is substantiated by newspaper accounts ("9
10/10/85, 10/16/85).

Jorn~d.g

It would appear that the earthquake

can account for only a small portion of the industry's hard
times.

The

u.s.

Embassy report (Perez Sanroman 1986) lists

the irregular supply of fabrics and other consumables, the
increasing cost of raw materials, lack of financing, and
static domestic demand as factors in exacerbating the
clothing industry's difficult situation.

It would appear

that the clothing industry, never on particularly safe
ground, was in an especially diff lcult position on the day
of the earthquake.
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THE NATION'S CAPITALISTS

The owners of the garment shops are the least known
element of the conflict, and this writer was unable to find
any studies of the owners of Mexico's garment factories,
either in Mexico City or nationally.

one of the main agenda

items of the Union ls to find out more about who owns the
shops and how they are tied financially to other businesses,
inside and outside Mexico.
Mexico's capitalists are generally referred to as a
monolithic group.

It appears that there ls only one book-

length study of Mexico's entrepreneurs available, and that
ls Derossi's The Mexican Entrepreneur (1970).

She studied

over 200 Mexican business and industry owners and managers,
deliberately selecting firms that are larger, better
capitalized and more technology-based, rather than from the
84\ of the firms which are part of the "artisan" class.

She

chose to study this sector of the capitalist class because
she felt that the potential for Mexico's economic growth lay
within it.

This focus provides a skewed vision of the

nation's capitalists for the purposes of this paper.
However, the work presents some findings which may be of use
in looking at the owners of garment shops.
First, most businesses are family run and owned, and
the smaller, older and more traditional they are, the more
likely they are to be completely or almost completely family
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dominated.

As firms get bigger, or move into more modern

sct·lur:; of lhc economy, family ties are less important, but

still account for much of the interchange among boards of
directors, sources of finance, etc.

This family orientation

can be seen in at least two of the events following the
earthquake: Shops at sites 15, 16 and 17 were owned by
brothers who moved their equipment to shops that they owned
in Toluca, a city in the state of Mexico (Fig. 3; Appendix
A).

The owner of the shop at Site 3 moved his equipment to

his brother's shop (Fig. 3; Appendix A).

These actions

indicate that there ls an underlying network of
relationships among shop owners that needs research.
Second, most entrepreneurs are either foreign-born or
first-generation immigrants.

There seems to be a difference

between those of Spanish origin and those of "other" origin.
The: Spanish are concentrated ln older, more tradl tional
industries, such as food, wine and textiles.

Having been in

the; country longer, they tend to be secure in their
positions and not willing to branch into electronics or
other more modern industries.

The "other" tend to be

refugees from Europe and the Middle East, who bring with
them a very different range of skills.

These immigrants

tend to go into the professions first, commerce second and
industry last, but when they do invest, they, like Mexican
entrepreneurs, chose the more modern sector of the economy.
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It appears from newspaper accounts that the majority of
garment shop owners are Mexican, Jewish or Arabic, mainly
Lebanese.

This would indicate that a substantial proportion

of owners are immigrants or are from families of immigrants,
who most likely go into the garment industry because it is
relatively cheap and easy to enter and leave.

This would

indicate that garment shop owners are from a poorer class of
immigrants than those researched by Deross! (1970).

In

addition, the anti-Semitic overtones of some of the protests
by the costureras would indicate that many of the owners are
recent immigrants.

Ironically, one of the bitterest labor

struggles reported in La Jornada took place in one of the
municipalities and was not part of the events of the
earthquake.

That struggle had been going on for two years

on the day of the earthquake and the owner was Lebanese.
None of the costureras' comments referred to his national
origin.

In addition, some of the costureras admitted that

Mexican owners were as exploitive as immigrant owners.
Nevertheless, one of the undercurrents of the conflict was
anti-Semitism on the part of the garment workers towards
Jewish owners.
ThiL<l, practically none of the entrepreneurs come from
working class backgrounds (8\).

Positions in the family

business tend to be inherited, and the education of the
children focuses from their earliest years on training for

l
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take over of the business. · Landowners dis possessed by land
reform make a significant source of capitalists, though not
all moved directly into industry.

Of the children of the

former landowning classes, about 25\ went into professions,
25\ into industry and 50\ into agriculture, but the

grandchildren of the landowners had invested predominantly
in industry.
STATE-CAPITAL RELATIONS
There has been much discussion in the literature about
the exact nature of Mexico's political bureaucracy and its
relationship to capital.

Hodges (1983) likens Mexico to the

Bonapartist state, in which political and economic power are
split, meaning that there are two ruling classes, not one.
Smith (1977, 1979) finds that the federal bureaucracy ls its
own class, separate from business and not particularly loyal
to it, capable of acting on behalf of foreign capital or
labor on occasion.

He finds that instead, the system ls

made up of "technocrats," who are more interested in their
own political careers than in managing the nation or
representing sectors of the populace.

Hamilton (1982),

while acknowledging that it ls not identical with capital,
finds that the federal government's power is severely
limited by the logic of the model of development that the
nation embarked upon in the early part of this century.
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The entrepreneurs of Mexico do not have an identity

with the government, as almost none of their children 90
into government and almost none of them have parents who
were in government (Deross! 1970).

There is, however, a

dependence on government ln the form of subsidies, licenses,
financing, etc.

Further, the government regularly increases

or contracts its share of the domestic economy, which means
that, in a sense, no Mexican enterprise is entirely free
from the threat of nationalization.

on top of this, the

government requires that all industrial sectors have
national chambers, or trade organizations, to which
membership is required and assigned by the government.

Votes within these chambers are weighted by size of firm,
which of course gives the larger firms the greater voice.
Deross! divides capital-government relationships into
three types.

The center-dependent are those businesses

which operate near Mexico City and are heavily dependent on
government policy for their survival.

The peripheral-

dependent operate far enough outside of Mexico City, in the
states immediately surrounding the Federal District, to be
out of the mainstream of contacts and benefits, but not far
enough out to be free of government interference.

The

peripheral-independent are concentrated in northern Mexico,
far enough away to be relatively free from government
scrutiny and which have developed their own networks of
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information and finance.

The first two relationships are

much too dependent on the government to be able to challenge
it, though the bargaining position of those businesses in
the center is stronger than those of the immediate
periphery.

It is the industrialists of northern Mexico who

can afford to challenge the government's central authority,
and not surprisingly, they form the base of the National
Action Party (PAN), Mexico's rightist opposition party.
None of the entrepreneurs of Derossl's study (1970)
expressed the opinion that labor unions were an important
factor in their dally operations or their future plans.
Labor, in their opinion, was entirely a creation of
government.

They expressed the opinion that where there was

labor trouble, the source was either an individual
attempting to gain personal power, or the government
attempting to put pressure in some way on their operations.
The entrepreneurs saw themselves as an extremely important
part of Mexican society, the source of its economic growth,
and did not see labor as a counterweight to their power.
" ... [T]he only countervailing power to business in Mexico is
represented by the government, not by labor unions" (Derossi
1970: 179).

Thus, though every industrial worker in Mexico

is covered at least nominally by a labor contract, the labor
unions are not seen by the entrepreneurs as institutions
with independent power.

They see unions as extensions of
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qovernment power and policy, which for the most part favor

their enterpr15es, rather than working against them.
The fact that most of the garment businesses are
unregistered, and therefore illegal, sheds some light on the
complex relationship between capital and labor in Hexlco.
In the f lrst place, 95\ of Mexico's small garment shops are
razones sociales, or unincorporated businesses owned as
personal property of the manufacturer (La Jornada 10/3/85).
A producer will often have several of these razones soclales
in his name.

If the pressure comes down on one shop, from

labor or from government inspectors, the owner often closes
it down and shifts operations to one of several others he
operates under his name (La Jornada 10/21/85).

Owners also

avoid paying taxes by keeping their shops personal and
unregistered.

However, they could not do this wihout the

direct complicity of government agencies, specifically the
labor unions, and regulatory agencies, which either ignore
the shops, or are part and parcel of their operation.

Thus

it is apparent that the government and the owners, while
colluding in the creation of the garment district, did not
have identical interests on the day of the earthquake, and
thus had to respond differently to it.

1
~
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THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT
Because of the logic of capitalism and the extiemely
uncertain economic situation on the day of the earthquake,
it became clear to all concerned that the means of

production--the machinery, the materials, and the
strongboxes that contained the money--were more valuable to
the owners than the workers.

The owners thus rescued and

attempted to restore their previous situation, but according
to the loqlc of their interests.

In fact, the owners found

themselves in the position of being able to take advantage
of. the havoc of the earthquake to make production chan9es.
The National Clothing Chamber recommended that its members
"suspend" all activities for three months, taking advantage
of the earthquake to make much-needed technological changes
or to relocate.

The first to apply this advice was

Confecciones Yanet (Fig. 3, Site 12; Appendix A}, even
though the factory suffered no damage, and 21 workers were
lctl wllh no salaries and no severance pay (La Jornaqa
10/4/85).

The owners may have been eager to take the advice

because, as the U.S. Embassy report suggested, "the
earthquake created an opportunity for the industry to
renovate its productive plant and become more competitive."
(Perez Sanroman 1986: 3).

They may also have been eager to

take the advice because the Chamber's attorneys suggested
that the applicable federal laws concerning pay and benefits
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would be "in exception" as a result of the suspension.
Businesses that were not damaged by the earthquake took
advantage of the fact that they operated within the zone of
damage.
Although the owners did not call out the Army, they
used lt to protect their interests.

In some cases, the

owners paid soldiers 2,000 pesos for each bolt of cloth that
they rescued (Informacion Obrera 1985).

In addition, the

Army, under the guise of maintaining public order after the
earthquake, soon came to protect the property of the owners.
The newspaper accounts of the earthquake reported that there
was very little looting throughout the city, and public
criticism soon focused on the fact that the Army units
should have been helping with the rescue work, rather than
pointing their guns at the citizenry.

Within a few days,

the role of the Army did shift, but in the meantime, the
whole rationale of its job was to protect private property
from theft.

Its actions within the garment district were a

direct result of this discharge of duty, and helped to
escalate a tense situation into political protest.
The response of the government was contradictory.
Proceso (10/21/85) pointed out the absurdity of the
embarrassed finger-pointing by government officials in
response to the revelations brought on by the earthquake.

8

Fidel Velazquez, the head of the CTH, blamed the conditions
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I

I
I

in the district on one labor director and said there were no
federal authorities to be blamed for the conditions.

He

claimed that he did not know of the conditions of the
factories because all of his clothes were made at home.

The

I

CTH leader for the Federal District blamed the federal

I

authorities (the courts and the inspectors) and claimed that

I
I
I
I

there were no labor leaders who sold union contracts.

One

senator blamed Rep. Hilda Anderson, who was also head of the
women's section of the CTH.

Hilda Anderson claimed that she

had always attempted to help the costureras, but they had no
education, no political ab111t1es, no organization.

Antonio

Burelo, the head of the Office of Conciliation and Arbitrage
(the labor court system) blamed the labor unions.
fired a week later for complicity with owners.

He was

Arsenio

Farell, the nation's Secretary of Labor, said that now that
tltt.'

condl tions ln which the costureras worked had been

brought to light, his off ice would seek to protect the
costureras, and naturally this protection would be through
labor unions and union contracts.
Federal authorities were not all words, either.

The

federal government set up an Off lee of Conciliation and
Arbitrage at the 150-164 San Antonio Abad location (Fig. 3,
Site 1)

(~a

Jornada 10/9/85) because the local office was

not functioning.

Hilda Anderson toured the area and met

with costureras, who did not receive her kindly.

Programs
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I

for women and youth offered assistance to workers who wanted

I

to

up cooperatives.

~et

After inspection by government-

I
I
I

provided experts, some of the buildings were closed by

I

not until four weeks after the disaster, too late to save

I

I
I

federal authority as unsafe.

Heavy machinery was finally

provided to the rescue workers for the garment district, but

anyone.

The House of Representatives appointed a committee

to research conditions in the district.

Five CTM officials

were fired for selling labor contracts.

President de la

Madrid met with the costureras, and ordered the secretary of
Labor to grant them the registration of the union that they
sought.

Last but probably most important in its long-term

impact, the government began a program of loans to garment
shop owners for relocation out of the area.
Hlspanoamericano (1986) reported six months after the
earthquake that the federal government was offering loans of
several million pesos to "mlcrobusinesses" in the garment
district to relocate in Toluca (Fig. 1), the capital of the
State of Mexico.

The earthquake gave the government a

chance to implement its plans to rid the central area of
these small shops to make room for its renovation of the
Centro Historico (Historical center).
It is apparent, once again, that a long history of
complex relationships lay behind the crisis of the
earthquake, and that the several actors responded according

1

I
I
I
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I

to the harm that they suffered and the interests they needed

I
I
I

to restore.

I

to use the changed circumstances to their advantage.

I

Perhaps that is what is meant by rescue and restoration: not

one interesting characteristic of all the

responses is that none of them was one-dimensional.

A

second characteristic ls that the responses changed over
time.

A third characteristic is that all parties attempted

that the previous social status quo will be replaced, like a

I

mended vase on the f lreplace mantle, but that people of all

I

classes and circumstances attempt to gather their resources

!

and survive as best as they can.

l
I
I

r,

I

I

I

I

CHAPTER VI

I

I
I
I

I
I

CONCLUSION

This paper began with a rather conventional question
regarding the impact of a natural disaster on society and
spent considerable time discussing social process.

By now

lt should be clear that these two issues are not separate,
and in fact it is impossible to assess the impact of a
natural disaster without having a very good sense of social
process.

It may seem, however, that all of this is far

af leld of geography.

What makes this problem geographical

is not that Mexico City is located at any certain longitude
or latitude, or even that it is built on an old lake bed.
What makes this issue geographic is that Mexico City is one

of the largest cities in the world today, that it has
undergone tremendous economic, population and structural
changes in the last forty years, and that the city is on a
large scale what the garment district ls on a smaller scale,
and vice versa.

What further makes this a geographical

problem ls that exploitation was built into the very
structure of the city, and a change ln that spatial
slLuL·lu.tc hull political consequences.

What follows is an

exploration of the implications of that fact.

l
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OPPORTUNITY SURFACE AND EXPLOITATION

!
I
I

I
I

I

Richard Peet, in his article "Inequality and Poverty"
(1975), argues that where Marxism and geography meet is in
an understanding that in order to perpetuate heirarchical
divisions among the poor and working classes, and between
them and the capitalist classes, differentials of physical
opportunity must be created: some schools are better than
others, some neighborhoods have no schools at all.
Inequality is thus transferred physically from one
generation to the next through an environment of
opportunities, or lack of opportunities, which surround each
person.

The "opportunity surface," or set of social

resources, into which each person is born, does more than
surround each person--lt in many ways shapes his or her
perceptions, awareness, values and in some ways her fate.
Each age group, each social class, each racial
group, each sex, has a different typical daily
"prism" in which to operate. For the lowest class
and most discriminated against groups, the prism
closes into a prison of space and resources (Peet
1975).

The social and spatial reality in which the costureras
found themselves constituted a very limited surface of
opportunities indeed.

Born into poverty, lacking education,

and moving along with hundreds of thousands of other people
every year into the one city where all the resources they
were lacking seemed to be located, they took the only jobs

i

I

I
I
I
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they could under their circumstances, jobs to which they

I

spent up to two hours to get to, and which hemmed them in

I

physically in an untold number of ways, even limiting such

I

simple acts as looking at other workers, or using the

I
I
I
I

I

bathrooms.

With such tight controls over their

opportunities, it ls not surprising that the costureras were
not always able to see the nature of their reality.

These

ideas have been expressed eloquently by the costureras
themselves:
When I say that we were blind to these realities,
what I really mean to put across is that ... a garment
worker really has to do her work and she is bounded
and her opportunity to see is pretty-much limited by
the four walls around what she has to do and she ls
constantly under the pressure of getting the work
out and she doesn't often have the opportunity or
time to get past the immediate demands of her
situation (Corona 1986: 2).
Ms. Corona went on to explain one way that resources are
denied to the costureras:
..• when we are at work the schools are open and by
the time that we are finished with our working day
schools are closed so we have no opportunity to
obtain a formal education ... (Corona 1986: 2).
The power of this particular lack of opportunity goes beyond
inability to read and write; it means being subject to
manipulation and exploitation emotionally and
psychologically as well as physically.

The "romanticized"

nature of the relationship between costureras and the owners
or bosses has had to be dealt with since the formation of
the Union, as have the subtle forms of brainwashing:
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And always there are efforts to keep us from
seeing the situation and actually blind us to
reality by offering presents, and parties at the end

of the year (Corona 1986: 2).

I

Not all costureras, of course, were totally blind to the

I

extremely limited daily path into which they were forced by

I

an array of social pressures, but there was little they

I

could do about their situation.

I

the district's record for quitting jobs.

Lupe Conde probably holds
She spent her

entire adult working life attempting to escape from the

I

garment factories, but always the almost literally closed
doors surrounding her forced her back.

Eva Corona described

the situation as being "boxed in" (Corona 1986).

It is not

surprising, then, that when the walls came down as a result
of an earthquake, the opportunity surface of several
thousand people changed.

They did not automatically have

access to more social resources as a result, but they did
have the power to meet each other in new ways and to express
their protest over their exploitation.
SPATIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The question that remains to be explored is just how
the earthquake, as its own event, caused the conflicts
within the garment district to shift into overt
confrontation.

The answer lies in the awareness of the

costureras of their own part in the production process, of

1
I
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their own exploitation, of the ongoing structuration of the

district.

Pred (1981) suggests that:

for most individuals some awareness ... of the
unnatural character of a given cultural reality
apparently is most likely to come about ... durlng or
after a massive or abrupt transformation of dominant
institutions and their projects: when the social
system malfunctions and power relations are
transformed greatly via conflict, contradiction, or
external disruption; when there is a radical
altering of the temporally and spatially specific
daily path couplings demanded by dominant
institutions; and when the way is thus paved for a
new vision of what ls natural (Pred 1981: 45).
This suggests that three things happened during the
earthquake.

One ts that normal everyday spatial

I

arrangements ("dally path couplings"), in which ordinary

I

social relationships, in this case exploitive relationships,
were deeply imbedded, were radically altered, so that the
costureras were able, indeed forced, to meet each other, and
to meet their bosses, in new ways.

Second, the new

circumstances in which they met each other changed the way
the participants perceived their relationships.

Saenger

(1986) says the costureras realized what they had in common
when they met each other on the streets.

That simple

observation shows the importance of the link between meeting
and perception.

It also sums up the radical change in the

lives of the costureras, who state that the earthquake shook
more than the buildings, it shook their minds too.
Third, the earthquake forced all parties to respond,
and all parties responded according to their own values,

1

I
I
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power, needs and perceptions.

As

noted in Chapter I, one of

I

the basic tenants of social theory is that "society," i.e.,

I

disaster victims and public authorities, respond to

I

disasters by attempting to restore the previous situation as

i

closely as possible.

I

that where people have different interests, they have

1

I

The caveat offered to the theory is

different senses of what needs to be "rescued" and what
needs to be "restored."

Furthermore, in this case, the

I

perceptions of the costureras was changing over time.

I

costureras not only met each other on the streets, but they

The

faced armed men and fleeing bosses, and there were several
thousand women in exactly the same circumstance, a fact
which had been known before, but which had not been so
visible, nor visible in an emergency period.

Their

perception of their place in the process of social
production and reproduction changed instantly as a result.
PEASANT VALUES IN A PROLETARIAN SETTING

James

c. Scott, in The Moral Economy of the Peasant

(1976), argues that peasants (rural agricultural workers)
have a value system in relation to their landlords and
rulers in which conflict is likely to break out not over how
much is taken, but over how much is left.

He states that

what will provoke peasants to revolt is a violation of the
fundamental right to survive, when not enough is left over

1
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after taxation to live on until the next year.

The

expectation is that landlords and rulers will not only
adjust their taxation from year to year depending on the
conditions of the harvest, but will suspend taxation
altogether, or even throw open their coffers to prevent
outright starvation, during a bad year.

When this does not

happen, political revolt often breaks out.
Beth Sheehan (1986) identified a deep moral outrage
that the costureras expressed in response to the events
after the earthquake:
The outrage expressed at the events that followed
the earthquake was as much a moral outrage at the
failure of employers and the state to meet their
social obligations and moral responsibilities as it
was a reaction to the miserable conditions of the
garment industry (Sheehan 1986: 2).
The costureras are clearly part of the stream of newly
arrived working poor, whose ties to their peasant culture
are not entirely severed.

Their status as peasants becoming

workers may help to explain their emphasis on the fact that
"they were going to leave us with nothing" and "now

I

have

nothing, no money, no job, no place to live, nothing."
Their expectation that the owners would take care of them
and help them out during a time that was obviously a crlsls
for everybody had its roots in their recent rural
backgrounds.
At the same time, however, when that help was not
forthcoming, and when furthermore, the costureras saw the

1
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owners taking material, machinery and strongboxes out while
women were literally calling for help, the costureras saw
more clearly their position within the existent economic
system.

Their "proletarianization" increased several-fold.

They were not only incorporated into an industrial system as
exploited labor, but they also realized it.

Eva Corona

explained the shift from "peasant thinking" to "proletariat
thinking" when she said:
Before the earthquake we thought the bosses were
nice because they gave us work ..•. We didn't know
anything about anything--we didn't know we had a
right to breaks, to holidays .... And we gave to them
and gave to them, chained to those machines (Proceso
11/25/85: 17).
This ls the clearest statement possible of what Arroyo calls
"the maturing of the working class" in Mexico (El Dia
11/19/85).

The earthquake, even though it provoked a deeply

engrained response rooted in peasant values, also acted to
help the workers realize how much had changed.

The women

were no longer immigrants from the country; they realized
that they were industrial workers in one of the world's
largest cities, in the heart of the nation's capital and
they had to protect themselves, as a class (Fig. 14).
CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE CONTROL OF SPACE

In one of the few articles attempting to apply
structuration theory to actual social process, Hoos (1986)
says that "this view of society has definite political

111

social control.

Segregated cities, Jewish ghettos, Indian

teservations, Bantu "homelands," prisons, male-only clubs
and schools, are not the symbols of power, they are the
means of power.

The only way to challenge that power is to

wrest control over the immediate space.

In order to

challenge segregation, it became necessary to move to the
front of the bus.

A daycare center and a collective kitchen

in the heart of the garment district may seem to be simply a
matter of good sense, but it is more than that--lt is the
beginning of a radical social change.

The socialization of

the unpaid tasks that women do to reproduce the labor force
has the potential of freeing hundreds, even thousands, of
women from their fundamental exploitation as

women~

The

question that remains to be seen ls whether such changes
will simply work to the benefit of garment factory owners by
providing support services which make it easier of women to
work at exploitive jobs.

Perhaps this is the key to

understanding why the formation of the Union, dramatic as it
was, was not the whole revolution.

It was, instead, one

step in a very long, very hard struggle to reshape all of
social space and structure so that it affords opportunities
to all people to realize their full potential.

1

I
I
I

112
LONG TERM SOCIAL CHANGE

i
I

A final word needs to be said about an area of
sociology from which can be identified a potential for some

I

I
I
I

very interesting research, and that ls the work on "emergent
groups" (Forrest 1978; stallings 1985).

These articles

argue that emergent groups are inevitable in emergency
situations, that they represent an outcome of natural social
processes that respond to real needs, and that they are not
inherently ln opposition to public authority.

However, the

articles also state that the groups are of very short
duration, for specific tasks such as search and rescue,
damage assessment and "operations," are made up of very few
people, and rarely formalize their relationships.

Clearly

something much different happened in this sitation,
something that bears much closer examination.

Something

happened, somewhere over time, to change a classic "emergent
group" into a political organization as events, and
consciousness, changed radically over a few days.

The exact

nature of those processes need to be examined.
In the f 1nal analysis, the emergence of the union of
costureras both represents fundamental social change and
does not represent such change.

In the first place, the

challenge to the political system was never a revolutionary
challenge.

As women demanding an independent union, they

did indeed threaten the existing system of power and

I

I
I
I

I

113

privilege within Mexico.

However, the process of marching,

petitioning, even going to the Presidential Palace and

I
I

meeting with the president of the republic, is a tried and

I
I

represents, in a sense, the most rational response the women
could have made in their particular circumstance.

I

bureaucratic process and go directly to the highest

I

perceived political power for dealing with their demands.

true method of political demand-making in Mexico.

Cornelius

(1974) argues that the working poor of Mexico will forgo

In this case it was the President of Mexico.

I

It

Without his

sanctioning of their movement, the women would have indeed
represented a threat to the system and it would have been

I

ruthlessly suppressed.

By insisting on government

protection and inclusion ln the system, the costureras were
both protecting themselves from brutal repression and
reinforcing the political status quo.

Further, by demanding

to be made part of the Social Security system, the housing
system, by demanding that government daycare be extended and
that they be paid as skilled workers, the costureras were
asking to be made part of the system of benefits to which so
many other workers belong.

In addition, they were

reinforcing the traditional system in which all benefits are
held in the central government and are dispensed to those
who organize hard enough to get them.
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This is not to say that the costureras do not
represent change in Mexico, but the changes are more subtle
and more permanent than the initial events implied, and
though the costureras have lost many of their initial
demands, the continual existence of their Union does
represent long-term social change.

First, several thousand

women have political organizing experience which they did
not have before.

Second, many thousands of workers have

recognized their place in Mexico's political economic
system, and that thinking does not change, though it may
take time for the social system to change.

Third, the facts

have come to light, and hundreds of thousands of people, in
Mexico City and in other countries, are aware of the
conditions in the garment district and the events of the
earthquake.

Fourth, supporters of the costureras met to

wozk across class lines for the cause, at least foI a short
time, and that act in itself makes some social change.
Finally, costureras are continuing the long-term struggle
for self-help, political change, international solidarity,
and a permanent place of their own in the garment district.
When this writer was in Mexico City on the anniversary
of the earthquake in September of 1986, a protest march took
place, in which the neighborhood organizations of those
areas most damaged by the earthquake protested their
continued homelessness and lack of basic services.

The

l
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costureras were part of that march and Eva Corona was one of

the speakers.

Then again, in March of 1987, the costureras

again participated in a march to the Presidential Palace as
part of the electrical workers' strike.

The costureras have

won a permanent place in the popular struggle ln Mexico.
Their fate depends on the outcome of that larger struggle.

ENDNOTES
1.

Throughout this paper, "Union" refers to El
Sindicato de las Costureras 19 de Septiembre;
"union" refers to unions in general.

2.

"Hazard" is the risk; "disaster" is the event.

3.

Anthropological research has also built up a body
of literature on the impact of natural disasters on
local communities (Torry 1979b). The bulk of this
work consists of case studies and again, the
geographic literature has not acquainted itself
with this work. Torry's work, however, is an
excellent starting place for geographers interested
in exploring this work, and it, too, suggests areas
which need further exploration.

4.

According to Lisa Block, a development worker in
Mexico City, La Jornada is a leftist newspaper
known for reliable national reporting that does not
follow the official party line, but is not
particularly good in its international reporting.
El. Dia is a paper that follows the government line
nationally but has good international coverage.
~xcelsio~ has an international reputation for high
standards and objectivity (along the lines of the
Christian Science Monitor), and Uno Has Uno is a
leftist newspaper known for its rigorous economic
research (Block Interview 1987).

5.

The peso was valued at approximately 350 to the
U.S. dollar in September of 1985; 750 to the U.S.
dollar in September of 1986; 1000 to the U.S.
dollar in March of 1987.

6.

Mexico's economy remains one of the most
nationalized economies of the capitalist world.
The government's share of investment has
consistently been about 40% for the last forty
years (Deross! 1970).

7.

The middle class was also included in the political
system, through a set of organizations collectively
referred to as the "popular" sector.
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8.

The conditions of the garment shops were not the
only secrets brought to light by the earthquake.

The central police headquarters were also damaged,

and beaten prisoners were found inside.

1
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APPENDIX A
LOCATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICTS,
From La Jornada 9/19/85 to 10/26/85
Site 1.
138-164 San Antonio Abad.
Dimension Weld,
1opeka, Amg_!, Carnival, Le Petit, creaclones Lody, Baby Duy.
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2.L.28/85. 600 workers were still trapped in the
building, some of them still alive. Volunteers and
rescuers, using shovels and picks, took out 25
survivors and 100 bodies. Survivors were taken to a
makeshift emergency medical center set up nearby, and
then were helicoptered to Humana Hospital. All rescue
work had been done by families and volunteers until
the 26th, when a team of French and U.S. rescuers were
dispatched by the government, in response to several
petitions by workers at Amal. on the 27th, four
bodies were taken out, and seven more were discovered,
almost in a row, but they were trapped under slabs of
concrete, and steel wire.
10/3/85. The majority of the owners had begun to take
out their materials, clothes and machines, leaving the
survivors and the families of the workers who were
killed uncompensated. The Steering Committee for the
Garment Workers Injured by the Earthquake (La
Prometora de Costureras Damniflcadas) was formed with
three goals in mind: to protect the rights of the
workers, some of whom had 15 years of seniority; to
prevent the owners from fleeing; and to take advantage
of legal means of redress. As a labor organization,
they could petition the labor authorities for an
embargo on the goods in the garment shops until all
disputes were settled.
10/5/85. owners at several of the factories,
including Dimension Weld, offered a settlement of 15
days' pay, payable in six months. The Boards of
Conciliation and Arbitration were not functioning and
the owners had begun to dislodge the workers who were
guarding machinery in the vicinity of the shops. A
stalemate was settling in.

,
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lQL~~.
Workers made an appeal to the public for
support in helping to impede the owners in their
taking out of the machinery. Workers from Topeka and

Amal joined workers at Dimension Weld and formed a

circle in order to prevent the removal of 30 machines,
but that was not enough to carry on the action. The
workers blamed the owners and the government for the
attacks against them by unidentified men, both in
their camps at night and during the confrontations at
the shops.
10/.7{85. Sixty bodies remained inside the buildings.
The volunteers could not get to them, as it cost
25,000 pesos per hour to rent heavy machinery for
removing the rubble, and there were not enough
volunteers to do the work. At the same time, workers
were guarding machinery and hoping for legal or
popular support. Five policemen arrived in the night
to dislodge the workers and the families so that the
owners could take out a little of what they had
salvaged. Some 1,000 workers of Topeka and Carnival
had spent three days encamped near the materials,
having been offered 5,000 to 10,000 in compensation
(approximately one week's pay). Several government
officials had arrived and made promises to deal with
the situation, but nothing had begun. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Boards were still not functioning.
The workers were asking for legal help and financial
support. At Baby Duy, the owner had told the workers
not to go near the building or they would be reported
to the police. At Lody, the workers had been sent
back to work (on the third floor of the building),
because the inspectors had not yet been around.
10L9/85. Workers at Lody, Le Petit and carnival
abandoned the buildings as unsafe after first going
back to work on request of the owners. The owners of
Carnival, Kayser and Le Petit warned the workers that
they would be accused of abandoning their jobs if they
refused to go back inside the buildings. The federal
government finally set up an ad hoc Board of
Conciliation and Arbitrage and its first action was to
place a 38 million peso embargo on the 30 machines
held by the workers of Dimension Weld. This was the
first successful embargo placed on owners' equipment.
Lawyers for the workers had f lve more in progress, and
announced that fifteen more would be filed within the
week. workers announced that they were demanding an
immediate opening of a local Board of Conciliation
(the federal government had taken over the local
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Board's duties); deliverance of death certificates to
families of garment workers who were killed so the
families could petition for compensation; creation of
a contract law dealing with the entire industry; and
end to the exploitive practice of blank labor
contracts.
l..Q.Ll~.
The owners of carnival paid workers 50\ of
their demand and sent them "on vacation." The federal
Conciliation Board was working around the clock, and
workers were coming forward to demand protection.
Fifty workers from Le Petit asked for protection and
100 from Lody did the same. Representative Hilda
Anderson from the women's division of the CTM toured
the area and assured the workers that the government
would render assistance to the workers with their
claims.

The workers of Lody were fired with 50\ of
their compensation rights, in spite of Board's
response to workers' demands for protection. The
workers of Dimension Weld announced that they were
attempting to form a cooperative to continue working.

10/17/85.

Rescue workers demanded more attention to
the buildings by government officials. Dozens of
bodies were still trapped inside, and the heavy
machinery sent to do rescue work had been appropriated
to rescue goods instead. Rescue workers also
announced that they had taken a large amount of
personal goods out of the buildings and asked the
garment workers to come and pick them up.
10/23/85.

Site 2.

San Antonio Abad and Jose T. Cuellar Streets.

The encampment of the costureras.
Site 3.

186 Manuel J. Othon.

Kayser.

Workers were required to return to work on
two of the five floors, even though the rest of the
building was totally destroyed. The workers panicked
when rescue workers caused a loud crash that shook the
floors and they left the buildings immediately. A
policeman in the area said that the building was in
extremely bad shape and that it "makes a person afraid
to go in there." Alberto Levi and Jose Konleszny of

l.QL.2.L85.
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Provest were studying the possibility of relocating in
this building because "there was little damage."
The building was closed by the authorities
as being unsafe.

10/11/85.

David Meta, owner of Kayser, sent 40
workers "on vacation" after they helped him take out
his equipment after the building was declared unsafe.
They moved it to 275 Manuel Delgado, to a shop owned
by Meta's brother. In a private meeting with the
workers, Meta threatened to blacklist any workers who
formed any d·enunc lat ions. The workers went ahead and
denounced the holder of their union contract, whom
they said had been in hiding since the earthquake.
Also, under pressure from the workers, Meta signed
with the Office of Worker Defense that he would pay
workers for the time that they were off work during
the moving of the equipment, but then he fired two
workers and ~hreatened to do the same to the others
unless they kept quiet.

10/18/85.

Site 4.

26 Agustin Delgado.

No name given for the shop.

10/9/85. Workers abandoned the building as unsafe
after first going back to work inside it.

Site 5.

75 Clavljero.

Pascual Bottling Co.

See Site 11.
Site 6.

260 Garcia Diego.

RopaMex.

10/26/85. The 27 workers of this plant had continued
working "through fear." The contract holder had not
shown up until the 25th of October, more than a month
after the earthquake. The union official had wanted
the workers to sign a blank contract, and when they
refused, he told them that they wanted everything
without working for it. The labor boss said that the
new Union would have to demonstrate its ability to
protect the workers. The workers insisted that veiled
threats from the union bosses who worked in
collaboration with the owners had been carried out as
much by psychological means as by concrete actions.
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Site 7.

Bolivar and L. Boturini Streets.
Ideal.

Pantalones

The owner, Yeroham, intended to rescue his
equipment without giving compensation to workers, who
had worked extraordinarily long days and worked almost
without protection. The 135 workers announced that
they considered official declarations of attention to
their case to be contradictory, since their labor
contract holder had told them that their embargo on
the owner's goods would not take place for fifteen
days, while the declarations said that it would begin
immediately.

10/12/85.

Site 8.

Bolivar and Lucas Aleman Streets.

Deval.

10/12/85. The four-story building was closed by the
authorities as being unsafe, but still the owners,
Manuel Romero Aguilar and Eduardo Romero, made the
workers work in the building, in spite of its "total"
damage, including three columns broken almost in half.
A delegation of twenty workers took a petition to the
off ice of Deleqacion Cuauhtemoc.
The workers succeeded in getting an embargo
placed on the owners' goods for two weeks, while the
dispute was being resolved.

lQ/17/85.

Site 9.

80 Eje Lazlo Cardenas.
shop.

No name given for the

With the help of the military, fifteen
workers were dislodged from the premises in three
days, while twenty bodies remained trapped inside.
lQLl0/85.

Site 10.

55 Izazaga.

Hiss Universe.

10/26/85. The factory had collapsed. The owner,
Elias Hichen Tuachi, offered to loan the workers 5,000
pesos. A week later he said this would cover the
week's pay for the work done during the week of the
earthquake and that he would discount it from their
next week's pay. Later he announced that he was
relocating.

l
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Site 11.

175 20th de Noviembre.

Piamonte.

Workers at the Pascual bottllnq company
(Site 5) gathered bedding, food, clothing and money in
support of the workers at Piamonte, while they were
sitting on seized goods, waiting for legal settlement
of their claims. The workers of Plamonte were seeking
indemnification, and successfully placed an embargo on
the owner's goods.
10/17/8~.

Site 12.

137 Izazaga. Confecclones Yanet.

10/4/85. The owners were the first to take advantage
of the National Clothing Chamber's recommendations to
suspend activities. The owners closed shop for three
months, even though it suffered no injury from the
earthquake, and left 21 workers without compensation
or salary. The workers decided to form a cooperative,
and received offers of assistance from government
programs for women and for young people. With the
assistance of these federal off ices, the workers began
to look for a location for their cooperative.

s it e 13 .

151 20th de Nov 1emb re .

D ' Ga t.1.~.•

.l0Lf.fu'Jt~.·
The 23 workers of this plant joined the
Union. Its owner, Ezra Henasche, had suspended his
operations.

Site 14.

130 Nezahualcoyotl.

S1s1.

l.QL18/85. Ninety workers were obliged by the owner to
work in the middle of the street, after assisting him
in the rescue of his equipment. In exchange, they
were given 50\ of their salaries.
Site 15.
Site 16.
Site 17.

Alarcon Street
Doblado Street
J.J. Herrero Street

No names given for the shops.

10/12/85. There were four buildings on these streets
where workers were still trapped. The rescuers here
had never received any assistance. Daz Marcos Cohen,
one of the owners, said he was not worried because he
had taken most of his equipment to Texcoco and Puebla,
where he had other shops. He said he was fortunate
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because he only had 30 workers at his site and that
since they started work at 8 a.m., they had not been

hurt by the earthquake.
Site 18.

Belissario Domingo and Republic of Chile streets.
Nuevg_ Yor_k.

10/12/85. Fifty workers waited for the arrival of
excavators, where workers were still trapped. The
owner had already taken out his goods.
!QLJ4L_~~.
Families of the workers were still
demanding machinery to move the rubble. Assistance in
moving the rubble had been slow and irregular. The
owner had given one hour of his time, and a television
crew had arrived to film them at their work. The
owner, Carlos Gonzales Moncada, had taken his goods
around the corner to 55 Rep. of Chile. The workers
were waiting for their labor union to act on their
behalf. The labor boss had told them that they could
not place an embargo on the owner's goods, and that
the owner had offered to relocate the workers.

Site 19.

87 Peru street.

No name given for the shop.

A six-floor building was damaged but still
standing. Of the 80 workers, 27 joined the Union.
The owner, Isaac Ixtepesqui, had already taken out his
equipment.
JOL£§.LJt~.

Site 20.

Republic of Ecuador, near the corner of Paraguay
street. StStr Dance.

l.QLl1L85.

This building was situated between two
buildings that had been completely destroyed. This
four floor building sustained major damage, on top of
its already existing rotten stairs and columns. The
owners, Ruben Bucay and Manuel Farca, had required the
workers to go back to work. There were still bodies
trapped inside. The building had been placed on a
list as Inhabitable, but then changed to
uninhabitable, and the workers refused to enter. They
offered to go back to work if there was an embargo
placed on the owners' goods.
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lQ/23/85. The owners pledged to violate the
requirements placed on them by government mediating
off ices, and took out their goods and hid them.
Site 21.

77 Ecuador.

Haguilas serrat.

10/26/85. The workers joined the Union. The owner,
Camerina Torres, offered workers 20,000 to 30,000
pesos in compensation. Some of the workers had eleven
years seniority.
Site 22.

153 Palma Norte.

Gales Shirts.

10/3/85. A group of 80 workers from Gales Shirts
denounced to Fidel Velazquez that the owners, Elias
and Alberto Fallena Adisi, took advantage of the
confusion and the earthquake to take all their
equipment from the their shop, with the intention of
disappearing. The workers were unable to resolve
their conflict with the owners because there was no
Board of Conciliation functioning. They reported that
other workers in the district were having similar
problems. If the owners did take out their machinery,
they would be completely justified ln the act if the
recommendations of the attorneys for the National
Clothing Chamber went into effect. These
recommendations would declare the entire industry in
the garment center of downtown Mexico City in a state
of emergency and therefore all work could be
suspended, which could affect up to 40,000 workers.
The suspension could place the industry in a "state of
exception" in regard to complying with federal laws
concerning pay, social Security, and indemnities.

APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION
~ept.

19, 1985. 7:19 a.m. an earthquake destroys an
estimated 500 garment shops, leaving 50,000 garment
workers unemployed and hundreds burled or trapped in
the rubble.

S~pt.

20, 1985. The army cordons off affected buildings and
prohibits entry of garment workers, family members and
volunteer rescue teams, while many remain trapped.
Garment shop owners bring in cranes to
retrieve safes, material and machinery, leaving bodies
and survivors unattended. Workers hold first allnight vigil to prevent illegal sacking of factories by
owners.

~~.L--1985.

Oct. 2, 198~. Workers from eight factories create the
organizing committee of Garment Workers Affected by
the Earthquake--Promotora de Costureras Damnificadas.
Oct. 4, 1985. First camp of displaced garment workers is
established.
Oct. 5, 198~. Informal protests and demonstrations become
widespread in the central garment district; workers
demand rescue equipment and compensation benefits due
to them under Federal Labor Law.
Oct.

First meeting of the Feminist Committee in
Solidarity with Garment Workers--400 attend.

7~985.

Oct. 9, 1985. Workers from 15 factories form the Union of
Garment Workers in Struggle--Union de Costureras en
Lucha.
Oct. 13, 198~. Organization of Downtown Garment Workers-Organizacion de Costureras del Centro--is formed.
Oct. 17, 1985. 150 garment workers win compensation worth
$38 million pesos.
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Oct. 18, 1985.

over a thousand garment workers from 26
factories march to the President's house to demand

compensation, the reopening of workplaces and

recognition of an independent union. President de la
Madrid orders resolution of their demands.
Oct. 20, 198~. The National Independent Garment workers'
Union "19th of September" ls granted registration-total number of affiliates nationwide ls estimated to
be 8,000.
Oct. 23, 1985. The "19th of September" sewing cooperative
is formed by displaced workers with compensation
payments; it employs 72 workers from 3 factories.
Oct. 25, 1985. Groups from 23 condemned companies and 26
active ones join the new union, demanding an industrywide accord on compensation payments.
pct. 29, 1985. Employers sign an accord to compensate
unemployed workers, and retract it the next day.
Nov. 4, 1985. A thousand garment workers occupy the offices
of the Secretary of Labor as a last recourse to gain
legal compensation for workers in 70 factories.
Nov. 7, 1985. Second march to the President's house to
demand solution to the demands of displaced workers.
Nov. 19, 1985.

The union calls its first strike.

Nov. 21. 1985. workers in "Rosy Bras" begin a sit-in to
demand reopening of the workplace.
Nov. 25, 1985. Garment workers march with feminists and
women from neighborhood organizations to protest
violence against women. Proclaimed the "Day of the
Garment Worker."
Dec. 1, 1985.

Union wins its first shop election.

Dec. 2. 1985. Demonstration in the central square to demand
negotiations with industry heads--only 8 of 80
companies have paid compensation.
Dec. 17, 1985. Workers accept the first collective work
contract negotiated by the "19th of September" union-the union gains 120 members.
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Dec. 21, 1985. 50 workers illegally fired for union
activity.
~an~

21,

198~.

Jan. 24, 1986.

A second collective work contract is signed.
Union wins third election.

[e~.

12, 198~. One of the largest garment companies files
for nullification of the union's registration with
labor authorities.

Mar.

~98~.

Apr.

~98~.

The union marches under its own banner in the
International Women's Day parade.

Three factories reopen workplaces for 150
workers affiliated with the union.

AQL_1!.L_198_§...

The union calls its second authorized

strike.
May 1, 1986_. Members of the army and special ant 1-r lot
forces prevent union members from joining the
International Workers' Day march. Garment workers and
supporters are beaten, some escape to join march.
ttgy_l2,__198~. Mother's Day--over five hundred union members
march to government offices to protest the repression
of May 1 and demand free and voluntary motherhood.

Aug.
~~pt.

1~

& 18, 1986.

19, 1986. Workers arrive at a Mexico City shop and
are met by 25 thugs in an effort to block election.
They gain entrance and "19th of September" wins.

Sept. 22 & 23,
~~.

Union wins fifth and sixth elections.

198~..

Union wins two more elections.

27, 1986. Registration of the union ls upheld in
court. Union demonstrates to demand a solidarity fund
for garment workers from the National Clothing
Industry Chamber.

Oct. 23-25, 1986. International Garment Workers' Exchange
and Solidarity Meeting takes place in Mexico City.
Oct. 25, 1986. Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTH) beat
up garment workers at a factory seeking "19th of
September" representation; 200 f lred from another
factory for demanding compensation.

I
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Nov. 12, 198~. CTH announces plans to form a national
garment workers union.

Nov. 26, 1986. Union members march on International Day
Against Violence Against Women. Union representatives
speak against sexual harassment of garment workers and
violence against union activists. Celebration of "Day
of the Garment Worker."
Source: I~ternational Bulletin of the 19th of September
Ynion, May 20, 1987.

